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THE SEPARATION-OF-POWERS THEORY OF
STANDING*
F. ANDREW HESSICK**
Under current law, a party must establish Article III standing to
bring suit in federal court. According to the Supreme Court, this
standing requirement is necessary to protect the separation of
powers. It does so by limiting the judiciary to its historical role,
preventing the judiciary from resolving disputes better suited to
the other branches, protecting the legitimacy of the courts, and
restraining Congress from empowering the judiciary to usurp the
role of the Executive. This Article argues that these separationof-powers rationales do not apply to all types of disputes. In
particular, they do not apply to suits by private individuals
asserting the violation of private rights, nor do they apply to suits
seeking to force state officials to act or seeking to exercise a
power held by state officials. Dispensing with standing in those
cases would remove an unwarranted obstacle to relief for
similarly situated plaintiffs, make standing more conceptually
coherent, and invigorate standing doctrine in cases that do
present salient threats to the other branches.
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INTRODUCTION
Article III of the Constitution limits the federal courts to
deciding only “cases” and “controversies.”1 The Supreme Court has
developed a number of doctrines implementing this provision of
Article III. “[P]erhaps the most important of these doctrines” is
standing.2 To establish standing, a plaintiff must show that he has
suffered or will suffer an injury in fact, that the injury is fairly
traceable to the defendant, and that the injury will be “redressable by
a favorable ruling.”3
According to the Court, the “single basic idea” underlying
Article III standing is “separation of powers.”4 The Court has
identified several ways in which standing protects the separation of
powers. First, it preserves the balance of power envisioned by the
founders by confining the federal courts to the historical role of the
courts.5 Second, standing ensures that the federal judiciary does not
1. U.S CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
2. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
3. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting Monsanto
Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)).
4. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997) (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 752); see also,
e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (“The law of Article
III standing . . . is built on separation-of-powers principles . . . .” (quoting Clapper, 133 S.
Ct. at 1146)).
5. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (citing Lujan v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992)).
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resolve matters more appropriately addressed by the elected branches
of the federal government.6 Third, standing protects the legitimacy of
the federal courts by allowing them to act only when necessary to
protect rights.7 Fourth, standing prevents Congress from enacting
laws enabling individuals to assume the President’s power of “tak[ing]
Care that the laws [are] faithfully executed.”8
But if Article III standing exists only to protect these principles
of separation of powers, standing law is overbroad. Although
standing must be established in every case brought in federal court,9
not all cases present equal threats to the separation of powers. The
risk to separation of powers varies from suit to suit, depending on the
identity of the parties, the rights asserted, and the remedies sought.
Some suits do raise separation of powers concerns that may support
the application of standing law. This group includes suits brought by
private individuals seeking to force the President or Congress to
exercise its powers—such as a suit against Congress trying to force it
to enact a particular law. It also includes suits seeking to enforce a law
whose enforcement is entrusted to another branch of the federal
government—such as suit by an individual seeking to enforce a
federal criminal law.10
But other suits do not threaten the separation of powers in ways
that justify the application of standing law. For example, a suit by a
private individual seeking to vindicate a private right does not
threaten the power of Congress or of the President; instead, it falls
squarely within the core power of the courts “to decide on the rights

6. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146–47 (“The law of Article III standing . . . serves to
prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political
branches.” (citations omitted)); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009)
(“[Standing] is founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the
courts in a democratic society.” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975))).
7. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (stating that standing helps to maintain the “public
confidence essential to” the judiciary (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,
188 (1974))).
8. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576–77 (1992) (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 3).
9. See F. Andrew Hessick, Cases, Controversies, and Diversity, 109 NW. U. L. REV.
57, 75 (2014) (explaining how courts have imposed the same standing requirements in all
types of “cases” or “controversies” under Article III); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 448 (1994).
10. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a
judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”).
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of individuals.”11 Nor are separation-of-powers concerns present
when an individual seeks to force a state official to act or to enforce a
state law whose enforcement is entrusted to a state official—such as a
state criminal law. Whether an individual may seek to enforce a state
power entrusted to a state official raises questions about the
appropriate allocation of power within the state. It also raises
potential questions about the allocation of power between the federal
and state governments. But it does not threaten the powers of the
President or Congress.12
Scholars have challenged whether separation of power is—or
should be—the basis for standing doctrine.13 They have also
extensively criticized the Court’s vision of separation of powers in
developing standing.14 But none has examined whether the theories of
separation of power given by the Court to justify standing support
applying standing doctrine to all cases.15 This question is of central
importance. The legitimacy of a doctrine, and the decisions it
produces, depends in large part on the doctrine being the product of a
process of “reasoned elaboration.”16

11. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170
(1803)).
12. See Heather Elliott, Federalism Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 435, 454–55 (2013)
(citing Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2674 (2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting))
(arguing that federalism principles, instead of separation of powers, should have guided
the Supreme Court’s standing analysis in Hollingsworth, in which proponents of a ballot
initiative banning same-sex marriage in California were denied standing to challenge a
district court ruling that declared the referendum unconstitutional); cf. Hessick, supra note
9, at 91–95 (arguing that federal standing doctrine should not apply in state law diversity
cases because they do not threaten the separation of powers).
13. See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 91–
101 (2012); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 635, 649 (1985).
14. Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 284–85 (1990); Abram
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1310
(1976); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
1915, 1940–41 (1986); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A
Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 436–49 (1996); Jonathan R. Siegel, A
Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 95–108 (2007) (criticizing the Court’s view of
separation of powers as unjustifiably restrictive of judicial power); Steven L. Winter, The
Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1363–
73 (1988).
15. For an argument that standing is not effective at implementing the Court’s vision
of separation of powers, see generally Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61
STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008).
16. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 143–52 (William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1455, 1465–66 (1995).
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This Article assesses the justifications for Article III standing and
establishes the extent to which that doctrine should apply. It argues
that if separation of powers provides the only foundation for standing
law, a plaintiff should be required to establish standing only in those
suits that pose a threat to the separation of powers. These suits
comprise actions by individuals seeking to force another branch of the
federal government to exercise its powers, and suits seeking to
enforce a law whose enforcement is entrusted to another branch of
government.
But in other suits, establishing standing is unnecessary to protect
the separation of powers,17 and in those suits, courts should dispense
with the standing inquiry altogether.18 These suits include actions by
individuals to enforce their private rights—that is, individual rights
such as the common-law right to be free from trespass and the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable government searches
and seizures.19 Establishing standing should likewise be unnecessary
in actions seeking to vindicate state interests. These include suits by
individuals seeking to force the state government to comply with the
law or to exercise one of its powers, as well as individual suits seeking
to exercise powers of the state governments (such as enforcing a state
criminal law). Neither private actions nor state-interest actions
threaten the separation of powers because they do not implicate the
powers of the President or Congress. Accordingly, if Article III
standing rests on separation of powers, establishing standing is
unnecessary in those cases.
Eliminating standing from these categories of suits would not
fundamentally alter the role of the federal judiciary. Historically,
standing was not a requirement in federal courts. Courts created

17. Although this Article focuses only on standing, the argument could be extended
to other justiciability doctrines, such as ripeness and mootness, because those doctrines
also enforce the scope of the federal judiciary’s power under Article III. See
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (“The doctrines of mootness,
ripeness, and political question all originate in Article III’s ‘case’ or ‘controversy’
language . . . .” (citing Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808
(2003))).
18. The argument in this Article is limited to suits brought by individuals. It does not
address suits brought by states. Although the arguments in this Article likely could be
extended to challenge the application of Article III standing requirements to state suits,
considerations about the extent to which the states should be allowed to assert the
interests of their citizens, especially in suits against the United States, complicate the
analysis. See generally Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L.
REV. 387 (1995) (discussing the considerations underlying state standing doctrines).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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standing as a separate requirement only in the twentieth century.20
Before that time, whether a plaintiff could proceed with a suit
depended on whether she had invoked the appropriate form of action
and was entitled to relief under that action.21 In order to maintain an
action in federal court, plaintiffs must still satisfy this requirement, in
addition to establishing standing, by demonstrating that they are
entitled to relief.22
At the same time, dispensing with standing in private-rights and
state-interest suits would have at least two important consequences.
First, it would remove an unnecessary obstacle to obtaining judicial
relief in those suits. Second, it would improve standing law. Many
commentators have criticized standing as incoherent and confusing.23
One reason for this incoherence is that the same standing test applies
to all cases, but courts have applied that test differently depending on
whether the case actually raises separation-of-powers concerns.
Eliminating standing from cases that do not threaten the separation
of powers would significantly reduce these inconsistencies. It would
also likely strengthen standing’s protection of separation of powers
because there would be less dilution of the doctrine through decisions
in cases that do not threaten the separation of powers.
This Article argues that, if we accept the Court’s claim that
separation of powers provides the sole rationale for standing,
standing law should not apply in all cases, or even most cases. Instead,
it should apply only to those suits that seek to enforce a federal public
right or to vindicate a federal public interest. This Article proceeds in
four parts. Part I provides an overview of standing’s development and
its current requirements. Part II describes the separation-of-powers
justifications underlying standing doctrine. It identifies four different
principles underlying standing doctrine. Part III explains how these
separation-of-powers rationales underlying standing do not apply to
cases seeking to enforce private rights or to cases seeking to enforce
state interests. Accordingly, it argues, courts should not apply
standing law to those suits. Instead, standing’s application should be
limited to suits in which an individual seeks to use the judiciary to
20. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 224–28
(1988) (tracing the history of standing).
21. See id.
22. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (authorizing dismissal of a complaint that fails to
state a claim for relief).
23. Bandes, supra note 14, at 227–29; Fletcher, supra note 20, at 221–24 (1988);
Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future of Public
Law Litigation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 315, 315–16 (2001); F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury
in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 276 (2008).
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exercise functions assigned to Congress or the President. Part IV
discusses the implications of changing standing in this way, explaining
how it would both remove the obstacle of standing in cases in which
the standing inquiry is unnecessary and reduce the inconsistencies in
standing law.
I. THE LAW OF STANDING
Standing is one of several doctrines that implements the
“[c]ases” and “[c]ontroversies” provision in Article III.24 Under
current law, to establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he
has suffered, or will imminently suffer, an “injury in fact.”25 That
injury must be “concrete” and “particularized,” and must be to a
“judicially cognizable interest.”26 The plaintiff must also show that the
injury is “fairly traceable” to the defendant and that it will “likely []
be redressed” by a favorable court decision.27 If a plaintiff fails to
meet these requirements, the federal court must dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction.28
Although decisions ground standing doctrine in the “cases” or
“controversies” provision of Article III, the Constitution does not
define those terms. Nor does the Constitutional Convention yield any
insights into their meaning.29 Thus, instead of flowing naturally from
the text of Article III, standing has developed over the years through

24. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Article III standing is not the only standing
doctrine. There are also judicially created prudential standing doctrines, which Congress
may override, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1975), though the Court recently
indicated that it could discard those doctrines, see Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 & n.3 (2014) (abrogating zone-of-interest test and
questioning other prudential standing doctrines). Although this Article focuses on Article
III standing, its argument extends to prudential standing insofar as those prudential
doctrines also protect the separation of powers by preventing courts from “decid[ing]
abstract questions of wide public significance even [when] other governmental institutions
may be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention
may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.” United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675, 2686 (2013) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 500).
25. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (citations omitted)
(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984); Warth, 422 U.S. at
508; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740–41 n.16 (1972)).
26. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61).
27. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
28. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998).
29. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911) (stating that Article III limits courts to resolving disputes only of “a
Judiciary Nature”).
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judicial opinions in a common-law-like process.30 According to the
Supreme Court, the “single basic idea” informing this doctrinal
development is “the idea of separation of powers.”31 The role of
standing is to ensure that the judiciary does not usurp the role of the
legislative and executive branches by limiting the circumstances under
which the judiciary can act.32
Standing has not always been viewed as essential to the
separation of powers. Indeed, standing did not flourish as an
independent doctrine limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts
until the early 1900s.33 Over the years, the Supreme Court has
justified standing through various instrumental and normative reasons
in addition to separation of powers.34 It has said, for example, that the
injury necessary to support standing increases the quality of the
decision-making process both by ensuring that the plaintiff has
adequate incentive to litigate and by providing context that forces the
court to be aware of the impact of its decision.35 It has also suggested
30. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (acknowledging that Article III “concepts have gained
considerable definition from developing case law”); U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445
U.S. 388, 401 (1980) (“[J]usticiability doctrine[s are] of uncertain and shifting contours.”
(quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968))); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503–04
(1961) (plurality opinion) (explaining that the Court “evolved” the various justiciability
doctrines); Hessick, supra note 9, at 62 (“[T]he Court has provided meaning[] to [Article
III] on a case-by-case basis through a common-law-like process that focuses on the
appropriate role of the judiciary in the federal system.”).
31. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997) (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 752); see also,
e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014).
32. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102.
33. Hessick, supra note 23, at 290. Scholars disagree about whether separation of
powers was the original motivation for standing doctrine. Some scholars argue that it was,
contending that standing developed to protect progressive legislation from judicial review.
MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 218 (2000) (“Justice Louis Brandeis and thenprofessor Felix Frankfurter developed standing to shield progressive regulatory programs,
culminating in the New Deal, from attack in the federal courts . . . .”); see Winter, supra
note 14, at 1374. Others have argued that standing originated as a tool to manage
caseloads. Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing
Doctrine? An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 STAN. L. REV.
591, 638 (2010).
34. This is not to say that the Court deemed separation of powers irrelevant to
standing. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472–73 (1982) (listing separation of powers and other reasons for
standing); see also Ho & Ross, supra note 33, at 650 (stating that empirical studies suggest
that by the 1940s separation of powers motivated standing). Though on occasion the Court
has disclaimed separation of powers as the basis for standing. See, e.g., Geraghty, 445 U.S.
at 396 (1980) (“The question whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain the
action does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers problems . . . .” (quoting Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1968))).
35. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
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that standing protects the autonomy of those most likely to be
affected by a judicial order because it restricts judicial access to those
whose rights have been violated instead of third parties.36 But since
1984, the Court has rejected these other bases for standing, stating
that separation of powers is the “single” idea underlying standing.37
Moreover, the ways in which standing protects the separation of
powers have changed over time. In the 1940s, courts understood
standing as applying only in a suit “by a citizen against a government
officer.”38 Since that time, standing has been expanded to provide
broader protections of the separation of powers.
For example, the Court has limited the types of injuries that
qualify for standing.39 The Court has said standing cannot rest on an
injury to an individual’s interest in having the government comply
with the law.40 According to the Court, that injury is a “generalized
grievance” that is “undifferentiated and ‘common to all members of
the public.’ ”41 Thus, redressing that injury is not “the business of the
courts” but is instead for “the political branches.”42 For a plaintiff to
have standing, she must suffer a distinct, concrete harm beyond that
experienced by the general public.43 For the same reason, the Court
has held that, except for in a limited class of suits based on the
establishment clause,44 a federal taxpayer’s complaint about the

36. See id. at 473 (“[S]tanding also reflects a due regard for the autonomy of those
persons likely to be most directly affected by a judicial order.”); see also Lea Brilmayer,
The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or Controversy” Requirement,
93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 306–15 (1979) (elaborating on the argument). Unlike with
separation of powers, these considerations are not constitutionally compelled. See, e.g.,
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2687 (2013) (describing the adversarial
requirement as “prudential”).
37. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[T]he law of Art. III standing is built
on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”); see also, e.g., Susan B. Anthony
v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (“The law of Article III standing . . . is built on
separation-of-powers . . . .” (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146
(2013))); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997).
38. See Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1943).
39. See Hessick, supra note 23, at 296 (describing standing restrictions as resulting
from concerns about interfering with other branches of government).
40. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1992).
41. E.g., id. at 575–76 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77
(1974)); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475 (stating that “generalized grievances” are “most
appropriately addressed in the representative branches” (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 499–500 (1975))); see also Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.3 (2014) (confirming that restriction on generalized grievances is
constitutional, not prudential).
42. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576.
43. Id. at 575–76.
44. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968).
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government’s misuse of tax dollars does not constitute an “injury in
fact.”45 According to the Court, the interest of the taxpayer is “the
interests of the public at large.”46
Likewise, the Court has imposed limits on standing to seek relief
from future injuries.47 The Court has said that future injuries support
standing only if the threat of injury is “real.”48 Similar worries about
interfering with the other branches of government have driven the
creation and shape of the traceability and redressability requirements
of standing.49
Because separation of powers underlies Article III standing,
most recent Supreme Court decisions shaping standing have involved
suits in which a private individual sues to force another branch of the
federal government to act or to abstain from acting—the type of suit
that most clearly raises separation-of-powers concerns.50 But the
application of standing is not limited to those types of cases. Standing
applies in all suits brought in federal court, even suits that do not
obviously affect the other branches of the federal government.51
Accordingly, federal courts have held that an individual must
establish standing when he is suing for the violation of an individual
right against another private actor, even though those suits do not
implicate the elected branches of the federal government. For
example, in Silha v. ACT, Inc.,52 students who took college entrance
exams administered by American College Testing, Inc. (“ACT”) sued
ACT, claiming that ACT deceived them and unjustly enriched itself
by selling personal information about the test takers.53 The Seventh

45. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599–600
(2007) (denying standing to taxpayers challenging use of federal funds to promote “faithbased initiatives”); Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 433–34 (1952)
(dismissing taxpayer action as alleging generalized grievance).
46. See Hein, 551 U.S. at 600.
47. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
48. E.g., O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (citations omitted).
49. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1066
(2015) (arguing that the traceability and redressability prongs developed during the
1970s).
50. See id. at 1105 (“The formative cases in the Supreme Court’s development of its
tripartite standing formula mostly involved private suits against the government and its
officials.”).
51. See Pushaw, supra note 9, at 448 (explaining how courts have imposed the same
standing requirements in all types of “cases” or “controversies” under Article III).
52. 807 F.3d 169 (7th Cir. 2015).
53. Id. at 171–72.
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Circuit denied standing, concluding that the plaintiffs had not alleged
that they lost anything of value from ACT’s misconduct.54
Courts have likewise concluded that an individual must establish
standing when suing state actors for a violation of individual rights.
For example, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,55 Adolph Lyons sought
an injunction barring Los Angeles police officers from using a
potentially life-threatening chokehold, arguing that the chokehold
constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.56
Although the suit did not threaten the other branches of the federal
government, the Court denied standing on the ground that it was
mere “speculation” that Lyons would be subjected to a chokehold in
the future.57
Similarly, federal courts have held that individuals lack standing
to force state governments to comply with the law. For instance, in
Lance v. Coffman,58 four Colorado citizens filed a federal suit
challenging a decision of the Colorado Supreme Court upholding a
court-drawn redistricting plan.59 They argued that the court-drawn
plan violated the elections clause of the U.S. Constitution, which
assigns the power to draw congressional districts to state
legislatures.60 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked
standing, concluding that they alleged only an “undifferentiated,
generalized grievance” that the Colorado government had failed to
follow the elections clause.61
So too, federal courts have required plaintiffs defending state
laws to establish standing. In Hollingsworth v. Perry,62 the official
proponents of a California state referendum banning same-sex
marriage sought to appeal a ruling of the district court declaring the

54. Id. at 174–75. For another example, see Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540,
1544–45 (2016) (requiring private plaintiff to establish Article III standing in suit against
private individuals).
55. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
56. Id. at 98.
57. Id. at 108.
58. 549 U.S. 437 (2007) (challenging People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221
(Colo. 2003) (en banc)).
59. Id. at 438.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 442. For other examples, see Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct.
2334, 2338 (2014) (applying federal standing doctrine to constitutional challenge to Ohio
law); Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 134 (2011) (denying standing
to taxpayers who raised establishment clause challenge to an Arizona law granting a tax
credit for donations to religious schools, explaining that standing generally cannot be
based on taxpayer status).
62. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
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referendum unconstitutional.63 The Supreme Court of California had
held that the official proponents were “authorized under California
law to appear and assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s validity
and to appeal [the] judgment invalidating the measure.”64 But the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the proponents lacked standing.65 The
Court explained that the proponents had alleged only a generalized
grievance—that the district court wrongly struck down the
referendum—and that the California court’s declaration that the
proponents could assert the state’s interest did not change the
analysis.66
II. THE SEPARATION-OF-POWERS RATIONALES OF STANDING
The Court’s claim that standing is necessary to protect the
separation of powers is deceptively simple. Separation of powers is an
extremely abstract concept.67 It generally refers to ensuring that the
respective branches of government do not infringe on the other
branches of government, but that sweeping concept does not say how
the powers should be allocated. Therefore, as Professor Elliott has
explained, the Court has not relied on the abstract concept of
separation of powers in discussing standing; instead, it has identified
several different principles of separation of powers in discussing
standing.68
The Court has noted at least four ways that standing protects the
separation of powers.69 The first three focus on the power of the
judiciary. First, standing doctrine maintains the balance of power
envisioned by the founders because it confines the federal courts to

63. Id. at 2660.
64. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1007 (Cal. 2011).
65. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666.
66. Id. (“[T]he authority . . . ‘to assert legal arguments in defense of the state’s interest
in the validity of the initiative measure’ . . . . is by definition a generalized one . . . .”
(quoting Perry, 265 P.3d at 1029)); see also Greenbaum v. Bailey, 781 F.3d 1240, 1241
(10th Cir. 2015) (dismissing appeal for lack of standing of private committee seeking to
defend constitutionality of a provision of the Albuquerque charter).
67. Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of
Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 301 (1989) (“[S]eparation of powers
frustrates analysis because of its abstract dimensions.”).
68. See Elliott, supra note 15, at 467–68.
69. Professor Elliott identifies three strands of separation of powers that standing
promotes: (1) ensuring that the dispute before the court is concrete and adverse,
(2) preventing courts from making decisions better left to the political branches, and
(3) preventing Congress from conscripting the courts to circumvent the Executive. Id. at
468. The four theories of separation of powers that this Article identifies differ in
significant respects from Professor Elliott’s categories.
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the historical role of the courts.70 Second, standing doctrine ensures
that the federal judiciary does not decide matters more appropriately
addressed to the other branches of government.71 Third, standing
protects the legitimacy of the federal courts by restricting their ability
to act to when it is necessary to protect the rights of individuals.72 The
fourth way that standing preserves the separation of powers focuses
on Congress: standing protects the President from the threat of
Congress enacting laws that confer executive power on private
individuals.73 Although they often overlap, these four categories are
distinct justifications for standing.
A. Limiting Courts to Their Historical Role
According to the Court, Article III confers on the federal courts
the power to decide only those disputes “traditionally amenable to,
and resolved by, the judicial process.”74 In the Court’s view, courts
traditionally resolved only “concrete, living contest[s] between
adversaries,”75 and standing enforces this limitation.76 On this view,
70. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998).
71. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146–47 (2013).
72. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982).
73. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992). Scholars have identified five
goals served by separation of powers: (1) promoting efficiency by allocating specific tasks
to institutions designed to complete those tasks; (2) promoting accountability for
particular acts by specifying which institution has that task; (3) increasing the likelihood
that law furthers the common good by having different constituencies participate in its
development; (4) increasing the impartial administration of the law by preventing
prosecutors from serving as judges in each case; and (5) preventing tyranny by
accumulation of power. W. B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 127–28 (1965). The Court has not identified which of these goals
standing promotes. It seems apparent that standing prevents accumulation of power. But
whether it promotes other goals is less clear. For example, one may argue that standing
increases the impartial administration of justice by discouraging the courts from exercising
the functions of the other branches, but that is not obviously correct because restricting
judicial involvement may undermine impartiality by leaving some disputes to executive
resolution. And standing is contrary to some of these goals. For example, standing seems
to not promote the common good, because it limits an avenue for contributing to the
development of the law.
74. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102 (citing Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356–57
(1911)).
75. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted); see Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009) (“Article III of the
Constitution restricts [the judiciary] to the traditional role of Anglo-American courts [of]
redress[ing] or prevent[ing] actual or imminently threatened injury to persons caused
by . . . violation of law.”); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting the historical basis for the personal stake
requirement).
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standing law protects the other branches from the courts by allowing
federal courts to exercise only those powers that they had at the
nation’s founding.77
The Anglo-American legal system traditionally distinguished
between public and private rights.78 Private rights were rights held by
individuals. Included among these rights were the rights to personal
security, life, and property; the right to enforce contracts;79 and
whatever other private rights the legislature created for individuals.80
The victim of a violation of a private right could seek a judicial
remedy for that violation by bringing the appropriate legal or
equitable form of action, such as a writ of trespass.81 Those actions
were meant to provide recourse for the violation of a right, but they

76. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102–03.
77. Summers, 555 U.S. at 492–93 (“[L]imiting the judicial power . . . to the traditional
role of Anglo–American courts, . . . . ‘is founded in concern about the proper—and
properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.’ ” (quoting Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975))). Despite the Court’s claim, it is not true that standing confines
courts to their historical role. Historically, individuals could invoke courts to vindicate
their rights. See infra text accompanying notes 187–89. And for most of the twentieth
century, whether a person had standing depended on whether he alleged the violation of a
“legal right.” E.g., Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137–38
(1939). But since 1970, standing has turned on whether the plaintiff suffered a factual
harm, not a violation of legal rights. See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Servs. Orgs., Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151–52 (1970).
Moreover, the Court has generally rejected the argument that Article III confines
the federal courts to the role of courts in 1789. For example, historically, courts could not
enter declaratory judgments; they could enter judgments for coercive remedies like
damages or an injunction. But in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227
(1937), the Court held that federal courts could issue declaratory judgments, explaining
that Article III “did not crystallize into changeless form the procedure of 1789 as the only
possible means for presenting a case or controversy[.]” Id. at 240 (quoting Nashville,
Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933)).
78. Hessick, supra note 23, at 279–86 (discussing the distinction in early English and
American cases).
79. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *117–41 (discussing “absolute”
private rights to life liberty, and property); id. at *119 (discussing “relative” private rights
acquired by “members of society”); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
1 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., 12th ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1873) (“The absolute rights of
individuals may be resolved into the right of personal security, the right of personal
liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property.”).
80. See Stephens v. McCargo, 22 U.S. 502, 512 (1824); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb
Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 694 (2004)
(“[L]egislatures have considerable power to create new rights and to redefine existing
rights in ways that affect whether they are public or private.”).
81. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, TRACTS, CHIEFLY RELATING TO THE ANTIQUITIES
AND LAWS OF ENGLAND 15 (3d ed. 1771) (discussing “[t]he remedial [part of law]; or
method of recovering private rights, and redressing private wrongs”).
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were distinct from the rights they protected.82 A person could suffer a
violation of a private right yet not be able to obtain relief because of
limitations on the action.83 A successful plaintiff could obtain
damages to compensate for the violation of his rights or an injunction
to prevent the violation.
Enforcement of public rights was more complicated. Public rights
were those held by the general community,84 such as the right to be
free from violations of the criminal laws and to navigate the public
highways.85 The violation of a public right was a public wrong.
Accordingly, the remedies for violations of these rights, which
included civil and criminal penalties, were primarily aimed at
vindicating the public interest instead of offsetting the losses to
individuals.86
Because actions brought to vindicate those public rights were in
the name of the public, the representative of the people (such as the
king) was a proper prosecutor to vindicate public rights.87 But the
sovereign could authorize other individuals to vindicate public rights
on behalf of the public. Thus, for example, early state and federal
laws authorized a private individual to seek redress for a public harm,
even if he had not suffered any personal harm, through a qui tam
action.88 Under those actions, an individual would bring suit on behalf
of the government for damages and would receive a portion of the
penalty paid to the government as a bounty.89 Similarly, in many U.S.
states and in England, private individuals could bring criminal
prosecutions.90 Moreover, in several states, disinterested individuals

82. Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777,
784–86 (2004).
83. Id. at 786 (“[I]f no form of action afforded judicial relief, there was no remedy
regardless of whether it could be said that there was a right.”).
84. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at *5 (referring to “the public rights and duties
due to the whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate
capacity”).
85. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at *2; Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 80, at
693, 695.
86. Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 80, at 693 (“[L]ike public law more generally,
penal law focuses on vindicating the claims of the public rather than on compensating
individuals.”).
87. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at *2.
88. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 775–76
(2000) (detailing history); Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 80, at 694.
89. Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 80, at 694.
90. John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private
Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 515–16 (1994) (discussing historical development of the
private prosecutor).
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could seek a writ of mandamus to enforce the public right to the
performance by government officials of their duties.91
With the exception of qui tam actions, private enforcement of
public rights was not as broad in the federal system. Unlike in the
states and England, the federal system did not authorize private
prosecutions. After the Judiciary Act of 1789 established federal
district attorneys to prosecute criminal violations, private individuals
had no power to prosecute under federal criminal laws.92 Although
the federal courts did not resolve whether an uninjured individual
could seek a writ of mandamus to compel officers to obey the law,93 in
other contexts, the Court limited private actions to enforce a public
right. For example, an individual could not bring suit for a public
nuisance;94 that action belonged to the government alone. If an
individual suffered a “special” harm from that nuisance, she could
bring a private action to vindicate her right against a private nuisance;
but she could not bring suit to vindicate the public right.95
If the purpose of standing is to confine federal courts to their
historical role, this historical backdrop suggests that an individual
should lack standing to enforce a federal public right—such as
ensuring federal government compliance with the law—unless
Congress has authorized the action (as with a qui tam action) or the
individual has suffered a distinctive harm that actually converts the

91. See, e.g., People ex rel. Case v. Collins, 19 Wend. 56, 65–67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837).
See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 80, at 708–09 (identifying states authorizing the
practice). Scholars have disagreed about whether England allowed disinterested parties to
seek writs of mandamus. Compare Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a
Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 822–25 (1969) (arguing that under early
English practices third-party strangers could seek mandamus), and Cass R. Sunstein,
What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 163, 171–72 (1992) (same), with Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English
Prerogative Writs: The Original Understanding, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1001, 1043–47 (1997)
(arguing that “mandamus was not available to ‘disinterested strangers’ ”).
92. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat.
73, 92–93 (1789); United States v. Murphy, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 203, 209 (1842).
93. See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 80, at 710 (noting that federal courts did
not resolve the issue).
94. Id. at 703.
95. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 564–66,
626 (1851). Notably, some cases suggest that injuries that would suffice for standing today
would not have supported a private nuisance action. For example, to support standing, an
injury may be a mere “trifle,” United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973) (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis,
Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 613 (1968)), but to support a
private challenge to a nuisance, the injury must be a “substantial, and not merely a
technical, or inconsequential, injury,” Bigelow v. Hartford Bridge Co., 14 Conn. 565, 580
(1842).
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action to an effort to vindicate a private right (as with private
nuisance). Some decisions limiting Article III standing for individuals
seeking to enforce federal public rights roughly hew to this line. For
example, in United States v. Richardson,96 a taxpayer brought suit to
force Congress to publish an accounting of its receipts and
expenditures, as required by Article I.97 In denying standing, the
Court made clear that it viewed the accounting clause as imposing a
structural requirement on Congress, not as conferring an individual
right to an accounting.98 The denial of standing thus comfortably fits
with the view that historically individuals could not enforce public
rights without sovereign authorization, because neither Congress nor
the Constitution authorized individual suits to enforce the accounting
clause. Moreover, the Richardson Court suggested that the taxpayer
would have standing if he had suffered a distinctive harm.99 That
conclusion is consistent with the historical practice of recognizing that
an individual who suffers a distinctive harm may have suffered the
violation of a private right that mirrors a public right.
But other decisions less comfortably follow the historical rule. In
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,100 for example, the Court denied
standing for concerned citizens who brought suit under the
Endangered Species Act, which authorizes “any person” to sue to
force government officials to comply with the Act.101 Although
legislatures historically could authorize private enforcement of public
rights, the Court reasoned that the right to government compliance is
a public right and that Congress cannot authorize individuals to
enforce public rights in the courts.102 This is not to say that the
decision in Lujan was incorrect. Some other separation-of-powers
argument may justify the decision in Lujan. But the historical
argument does not justify Lujan’s conclusion.
B.

Protecting the Democratically Accountable Branches

A separate function of standing is to ensure that the federal
judiciary stays within the “proper—and properly limited—role of the

96. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
98. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 176–77.
99. Id. at 180 (stating that a “particular, concrete injury” would support standing
(quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740–41 n.16 (1972))).
100. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
101. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2012); Lujan, 504
U.S. at 578.
102. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576.
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courts in a democratic society.”103 In this role, standing allows courts
to operate in their appropriate sphere as courts, but prevents
individuals from using the courts to address matters that should be
left to the political branches.104
There is disagreement on the appropriate role of the courts in a
democracy. Some have argued that the function of the federal courts
is only to provide remedies for violations of rights.105 Under this
“dispute resolution” model,106 the role of the federal courts is not to
expound on constitutional or other legal questions or to police the
other branches of government.107 Courts may engage in these
functions, but only in the course of resolving a dispute arising from
the violation of rights.108 Others have rejected that model as too
narrow in favor of the broader “special functions” model.109 Under
this model, the role of federal courts is not only to remedy violations
of rights, but also to articulate constitutional values and ensure
government compliance with the law.110
For its part, the Court has adopted the narrower dispute
resolution model in fashioning standing.111 This understanding of the

103. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
104. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146–47 (2013) (“The law of
Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent
the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.” (citing
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009))); Elliott, supra note 15, at 475
(“Here standing [asks] whether . . . a plaintiff is bringing an issue to the court that, even if
susceptible to judicial resolution, is more properly answered elsewhere.”).
105. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009) (“Article III of the
Constitution restricts [the judiciary] to the traditional role of Anglo-American
courts . . . [of] redress[ing] or prevent[ing] actual or imminently threatened injury to
persons caused by . . . violation of law.”).
106. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 73 (6th ed. 2009).
107. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE
L.J. 1363, 1365 (1973).
108. See Summers, 555 U.S. at 492 (“Except when necessary in the execution of that
function, courts have no charter to review and revise legislative and executive action.”
(citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992))); Herbert Wechsler, The
Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1965) (“Federal
courts . . . pass on constitutional questions because . . . they must decide a litigated issue
that is otherwise within their jurisdiction . . . .”).
109. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 106, at 73; Bandes, supra note 14, at 284;
Monaghan, supra note 107, at 1368–71.
110. See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 106, at 73.
111. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (limiting standing to
plaintiffs who seek redress for their injuries). Although the dispute resolution model
underlies standing, several other justiciability doctrines rest on the special functions
model. See Hessick, supra note 9, at 64–65 (providing examples).
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role of the judiciary provides a core foundation for the current
concrete-injury requirement of standing. According to the Court,
restricting standing in suits by private individuals to only those
individuals who suffer a concrete individualized injury ensures that
the judiciary stays within its “province . . . to decide on the rights of
individuals”112 and does not address “abstract questions of wide public
significance” that are more appropriately addressed to the political
branches.113 Accordingly, individuals lack standing to seek judicial
relief for “generalized grievance[s]” that are “undifferentiated and
‘common to all members of the public.’ ”114 Based on this reasoning,
the Court has denied standing for individuals claiming to have been
injured by the failure of the government to obey the law, stating that
a person’s interest in seeing the government obey the law is a “public
interest” shared by all citizens.115 Similar reasoning undergirds the
denial of taxpayer standing to challenge the legality of government
spending.116
Under the Court’s view of the appropriate role of the courts, the
restriction on suits alleging generalized grievances makes some sense.
Generalized grievances involve injuries shared collectively by the
public. In a democracy, the people as a whole should address
collective harms.117 They may do so through the election of
representatives tasked to handle general societal problems. Allowing
individuals to sue whenever they disagree with the outcomes of this
process would circumvent that democratic process by allowing one
person to dictate how the people should govern themselves.
On this view, a person should not have standing to sue to force
Congress to enact or repeal a law simply because she thinks it would
result in a better society. Nor, as the Court has held, should an
individual have standing to sue the Executive based simply on a
112. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170
(1803)).
113. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc. 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)); see also
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (stating that “[v]indicating the public interest . . . is the function of
Congress and the Chief Executive”).
114. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974) (quoting Ex parte Levitt,
302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam)) (citation omitted).
115. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576.
116. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599–600
(2007) (denying taxpayer standing because the interest of the taxpayer is the “the interests
of the public at large”); Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 433–34
(1952) (dismissing taxpayer action as alleging generalized grievance).
117. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 893, 896–97 (1983).
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desire that the Executive enforce a particular law.118 The Executive
cannot enforce all the laws all the time because of finite resources.
One consideration in casting a vote for a presidential candidate is
which laws he will enforce against whom. Allowing a private suit to
challenge those decisions would undermine that election process and
shift the power of allocating resources from the President to the
courts.119
One might argue that claims of concrete harms are also better
suited for the political branches if many people have suffered the
same type of harm. Justice Scalia once espoused this view.120 He
argued that when a majority of people share an injury, that group may
resort to the majoritarian political process for relief.121 Judicial relief
is appropriate only to protect individuals who suffer particular
injuries that distinguish them from the majority because those
individuals cannot depend on the political process.122 On this view,
even if a person alleges a concrete, individualized injury, she should
be denied standing if a substantial number of others suffered similar
injuries. For example, if an individual faced a substantial risk of
getting cancer from the emission of toxic waste, he would not have
standing to seek to enjoin the emission if every other person in the
country faced a comparable risk. Instead, he would have to seek a
political remedy.
Even if the political process is equipped to handle widespread
injuries,123 it is not a judicial usurpation of the powers of the political
branches for the courts to hear those claims—at least not under the

118. E.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986) (denying standing to an
individual seeking to force the State to enforce criminal laws).
119. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 41 (1984).
120. Scalia, supra note 117, at 895–97.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. It is hardly clear that the political process is well suited to remedy widespread
injuries because of collective action problems. A rational person who suffers even a
significant widespread harm may choose not to spend his time and money securing a
political remedy because others who were also injured may seek to obtain that political
redress. See Siegel, supra note 14, at 101. The problems are worse when the injury to each
person is relatively minor so that the cost to each person of obtaining redress exceeds the
benefits. The court system has the class action to deal with similar problems, but no
equivalent exists for political remedies. Brian J. Shea, Note, Better Go It Alone: An
Extension of Fiduciary Duties for Investment Fund Managers in Securities Class Action
Opt-Outs, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 255, 261 (2015). Further hampering a political
remedy for widespread harm is that, if the challenged act conferred substantial benefits on
a small group, that group is likely to have strong incentives to seek political support to
maintain the benefit. Siegel, supra note 14, at 101–02.
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Court’s view of the appropriate role of the judiciary in a democracy.
That is because, even though many people suffered similar injuries,
each individual suffered an individualized injury, and the core
function of the judiciary, in the Court’s view, is to provide remedies
for concrete, individualized injuries.124 A person who suffers a burn in
a fire thus should have standing even if the fire burned many others.125
Moreover, in suits invoking statutory and constitutional rights,
vindicating those rights does not result in the courts displacing the
political branches because the political process created the law that
provides the basis for relief.126
It is therefore unsurprising that the Court has not denied
standing based solely on the widespread nature of an injury. To the
contrary, it has consistently concluded that the number of people
harmed has no bearing on standing.127 Indeed, allowing judicial
recovery for widespread harm is the basis for class actions.128 To be
sure, there have been several decisions in which one might argue the
Court did deny standing based on widespread, concrete harm. For
example, in Allen v. Wright,129 the Court held that the stigma black
plaintiffs suffered from the IRS’s failure to prevent discrimination
against other blacks was not a basis for standing to sue the IRS.130
Although that stigma seems to be a concrete and personal injury, the
Court did not deny standing on the ground that the stigma was too
widespread of an injury. Instead, it concluded that the injury was
“abstract” and that recognizing standing would transform the courts

124. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
125. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 36 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. See Chayes, supra note 14, at 1314 (“For cases brought under an Act of
Congress . . . . [t]he courts can be said to be engaged in carrying out the legislative will, and
the legitimacy of judicial action can be understood to rest on a delegation from the
people’s representatives.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public
Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1473 (1988).
127. See, e.g., Akins, 524 U.S. at 24 (majority opinion) (“[W]here a harm is concrete,
though widely shared, the Court has found ‘injury in fact.’ ” (citing Pub. Citizen v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449–50 (1989))); accord id. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (“[T]he fact that particular environmental
interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of
legal protection through the judicial process.”).
128. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). See generally 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1753.1 (3d ed. 2005) (providing an overview of
the purpose of class actions).
129. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
130. Id. at 755–56.
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into “a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned
bystanders.”131
In short, standing protects the other elected branches by barring
individuals from bringing suit simply to challenge the way that the
other branches of government have exercised their power. But it does
not prohibit individuals from bringing suit, even suits that seek to
force the other branches to act, when they seek relief for personal,
distinctive harms that they have suffered.
C.

Protecting Legitimacy

The Court has suggested a third way that standing doctrine
protects the separation of powers: it prevents the judiciary from
weakening by protecting its legitimacy. The Court has intimated that
the legitimacy of the federal judiciary depends on establishing for the
public that courts act out of necessity to protect individual interests
instead of out of the judges’ desire to achieve particular policy
goals.132 Requiring plaintiffs to establish standing helps achieve that
goal.133 As Justice Stevens explained, limiting judicial action to when a
plaintiff has demonstrated standing ensures the courts do not simply
“engage in the business of giving legal advice,” which would “chip
away a part of the foundation of [the judiciary’s] independence
and . . . strength.”134
This argument is not that standing doctrine is compelled by
Article III and therefore it would be illegitimate for courts not to
131. Id. at 756 (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)). Similarly, in Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., the Court held that the
psychological distress caused by the government’s illegal conduct is not an adequate injury
to support standing. 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982); see also Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S.
497, 541 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that global warming was not a
“particularized” injury because it “is a ‘phenomenon harmful to humanity at large’ ”
(quoting Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 415 F.3d 50, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Sentelle, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in judgment))).
132. E.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474 (suggesting that the “public confidence” in the
courts depends on the courts “refrain[ing] from passing upon the constitutionality of an
act [of the representative branches] unless . . . the question is raised by a party whose
interests entitle him to raise it” (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919))).
133. Id. (stating that standing helps to maintain the “public confidence essential to” the
judiciary (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell J.,
concurring))).
134. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 103 (1978)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that standing helps to ensure that the
judiciary is “held to account” by revealing “what persons or groups are invoking the
judicial power, the reasons that they have brought suit, and whether their claims are
vindicated or denied”).
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require plaintiffs to establish standing. Rather, the argument is that
the legitimacy of the judiciary depends on the acceptance of its
actions by the public,135 and acting only when a plaintiff has standing
increases the likelihood of public acceptance of judicial decisions.136
It is doubtful that federal standing law is essential to maintaining
judicial legitimacy. To start, it is unlikely that the public has a clear,
consistent opinion about when the judiciary should act. Further, as
Paul Bator has written, “[t]he judicial power is neither a Platonic
essence nor a pre-existing empirical classification.”137 Many states,
which are not bound by Article III,138 have adopted models in which a
personal stake is not a prerequisite to invoking the judicial power.139
In Utah, for example, plaintiffs may have standing when there is no
other person better situated to bring suit.140 And many states waive
standing requirements in cases raising important public interests.141
Nothing suggests that these state doctrines strip the courts of those

135. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474 (stating that standing helps to maintain the
“public confidence essential to” the judiciary).
136. Public acceptance of government action is one well-recognized means of securing
legitimacy. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1787, 1795 (2005) [hereinafter Fallon, Legitimacy] (stating governmental institution has
legitimacy when “the relevant public regards it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise
deserving of support”); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution:
An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 589 (2001) [hereinafter
Fallon, Stare Decisis] (arguing that norms can acquire legitimacy through social
acceptance).
137. Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative
Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 265 (1990); see also Helen Hershkoff, State
Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1833, 1911–13 (2001) (arguing that there is no single concept of the judicial power).
138. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“[T]he constraints of Article
III do not apply to state courts . . . .”).
139. See Hessick, supra note 9, at 66–68 (gathering different standing tests from
different states).
140. Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1104 (Utah 2013) (explaining that a party
proves its appropriateness “by demonstrating that it has the interest necessary to
effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual
questions and that the issues are unlikely to be raised if the party is denied standing”
(quoting Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 148 P.3d 960, 972 (Utah
2006))).
141. See, e.g., Vill. Rd. Coal. v. Teton Cty. Hous. Auth., 298 P.3d 163, 168 (Wyo. 2013)
(relaxing standing in cases of “great public interest” (quoting Maxfield v. State, 294 P.3d
895, 900 (Wyo. 2013))); Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, Inc., 108 P.3d 917, 919 (Ariz.
2005) (en banc) (same); Nebraskans Against Expanded Gambling, Inc. v. Neb.
Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n, 605 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Neb. 2000) (noting
“great public concern” exception for standing (citing Cunningham v. Exon, 276 N.W.2d
213, 215 (Neb. 1979))).
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states of their legitimacy.142 To the contrary, broad judicial access may
improve public regard for state courts insofar as it allows broader
access to justice, provides private individuals with an avenue for
participating in public decision making, reduces the political power of
interest groups, and provides a means for combatting governmental
inaction because of political realities.143
Indeed, federal justiciability doctrines themselves do not
subscribe to a single vision of the appropriate role of the courts.
Although the dispute resolution model underlies standing and most
other justiciability doctrines, other justiciability doctrines rest on the
broader special functions model.144 For example, under the “capable
of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine,
a court will not dismiss a claim that is otherwise moot if there is a
reasonable probability that the defendant will again engage in the
complained-of conduct.145 In that situation, the plaintiff no longer has
a real stake in the case—an order favorable to the plaintiff will not
provide him with tangible relief—yet courts have nevertheless
concluded that they may resolve the dispute.146 More generally, the
justiciability doctrines do not limit the scope of issues that federal
courts address. Federal courts regularly write dicta about important
issues unnecessary to resolving the disputes before them.147 There is
no indication that these practices have undermined the legitimacy of
the courts. Indeed, to the extent one hears complaints about the
legitimacy of federal courts in the context of standing, they tend to be
that the denial of standing illegitimately insulates wrongdoers from
answering for their actions in court and results in the withholding of
judicial remedies,148 and that standing doctrine discriminates by
142. See, e.g., Ben Winslow, Utah Court System Has 93% Approval Rating, Chief
Justice Boasts, FOX 13: SALT LAKE CITY (Jan. 27, 2014, 3:55 PM), http://fox13now.com
/2014/01/27/utah-court-system-has-93-approval-rating-chief-justice-boasts/ [https://perma.cc
/L7MN-WXSY] (reporting that Utah courts have a ninety-three percent approval rating).
143. Hershkoff, supra note 137, at 1917–19, 1922, 1927.
144. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
145. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998). Although the Court has often
described the exception as applying when the particular plaintiff might reasonably again
experience the threatened conduct, see id., in several cases the Court has applied the
exception without regard to whether the issue would arise again between the same parties.
See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 187 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).
146. Similarly, although federal courts forbid “feigned” suits today, in the past those
suits were allowed to proceed. See, e.g., Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33, 33–34
(1804) (resolving dispute involving only “a feigned issue”).
147. Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1249, 1269–71 (2006) (noting the widespread practice of issuing dicta).
148. See, e.g., Lynn D. Lu, Standing in the Shadow of Tax Exceptionalism: Expanding
Access to Judicial Review of Federal Agency Rules, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 73, 78 (2014)
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systematically favoring regulated entities over regulatory
beneficiaries.149
More importantly, judicial legitimacy likely depends more on the
substantive issues before the court and the way that the court decides
those issues than on whether the plaintiff has standing. People tend to
be most interested in cases that touch on divisive social issues or
challenge the actions of law enforcement officers and other
government officials, and they are quickest to condemn the decisions
in those cases with which they disagree.150 Korematsu v. United
States,151 Dred Scott v. Sandford,152 and the 1930s decisions striking
down New Deal legislation153 are obvious examples.
To be sure, some decisions that generate cries of illegitimacy
present serious questions of justiciability. Bush v. Gore,154 in which
the Court stopped a recount of ballots submitted in Florida for the
presidential election, resulting in the election of George W. Bush as
President, provides an example.155 There is a serious question whether
the dispute involved a non-justiciable political question.156 But most
criticisms of the decision have focused on the equal protection
analysis instead of the justiciability of the case.157
(claiming that “standing doctrine illegitimately insulates the IRS—and, by extension, other
federal agencies—from accountability for the harmful consequences of their rulemaking
decisions”).
149. See Elliott, supra note 15, at 488–89; see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for
Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 304, 324–28 (2002) (arguing
that standing “systematically favors the powerful over the powerless”).
150. See Siegel, supra note 14, at 96 (arguing people complain about “cases in which
the Court has been at its most adventurist in discovering constitutional constraints that are
not textually obvious, in striking down the work of political actors, in reforming longstanding social practices”).
151. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
152. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
153. E.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 3 (1936) (invalidating the Agricultural
Adjustment Act); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 495
(1935) (invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act); see WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN
THE TIME OF ROOSEVELT 161–62 (1995) (discussing discontent flowing from these
decisions).
154. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
155. Id. at 111.
156. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 275–77
(2002) (arguing that the case presented a political question).
157. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT
HIJACKED ELECTION 2000, at 174 (2001); Pamela S. Karlan, Unduly Partial: The Supreme
Court and the Fourteenth Amendment in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 587, 589
(2001). See generally Fallon, Legitimacy, supra note 136, at 1816 (noting this focus of
criticism). But see Barkow, supra note 156, at 275–77 (criticizing the decision on political
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By the same token, people are likely to approve of decisions with
which they agree, even if there are serious doubts about whether the
court had the power to render the decision. For example, Republican
approval of the Supreme Court went up twenty points after the
Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore.158
The claim that standing is essential to protect legitimacy is
further undermined by the fact that public interest, and thus the
possibility that the public will care enough to reject a decision, tends
to increase as a case progresses up the appellate hierarchy and the
precedential effect of the decision increases.159 Accordingly, if
standing is aimed at protecting legitimacy, its requirements should
vary depending on the court hearing the claim. But they do not do so;
the same standing test applies in district courts, circuit courts, and the
Supreme Court.160
None of this is to say that standing never helps to protect judicial
legitimacy. There could well be serious claims of illegitimacy because
of judicial overstepping if courts allowed private individuals to
exercise government functions, such as initiating prosecutions or
dictating the content of federal legislation. Allowing an individual to
choose who should be prosecuted could result in arbitrary and
vindictive prosecutions;161 likewise, empowering an individual to set

question grounds). Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), provides another example. The
decision in that case expanded “the capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to
mootness, see id. at 125; Hessick, supra note 23, at 327 n.316, but the criticisms of the
decision generally focus on the substantive decision that there is a fundamental right to
abortion, not the exercise of judicial power, see, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 922 (1973) (listing substantive
criticisms).
158. See KARLYN H. BOWMAN & ANDREW RUGG, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB.
POLICY RESEARCH, AEI PUBLIC OPINION STUDIES: PUBLIC OPINION ON THE SUPREME
COURT 9–10 (2012), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/-possupremecourtjune-20122_162919650849.pdf [https://perma.cc/AC5F-PQN9].
159. See Michael L. Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy” in Supreme Court Opinions, 64
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1020 (2007) (noting greater sociological legitimacy concerns
in Supreme Court opinions than in decisions of lower courts); see also ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 118, 198 (2d ed. 1986) (focusing his “passive virtues” argument on the Supreme
Court because “the lower courts can act in constitutional matters as stop-gap or relatively
ministerial decisionmakers only”); Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court’s Agenda—
and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (2006) (“[A]lthough concerns about government
by judiciary need not be restricted to or focused on the Supreme Court, in practice the
Court is the most frequent object of worries about judicial activism . . . .”).
160. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615–16 (1989) (applying the injury-infact test for standing to proceed in Supreme Court).
161. Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 781, 816–17 (2009).
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federal legislation could result in the promulgation of self-interested
laws that lack majority support.162 But outside these contexts, standing
plays little role in protecting judicial legitimacy, and in any event,
these legitimacy concerns are not the ones identified by the Court.
Of course, standing could be refashioned to protect the public
attitude toward the judiciary. Alexander Bickel argued that the
Supreme Court should use standing and other jurisdictional doctrines
to avoid deciding controversial questions to preserve its legitimacy.163
But the standing doctrine envisioned by Bickel is not a constitutional
one commanded by the separation of powers; instead, it is a
discretionary one that the Court may invoke when it deems it prudent
to do so.164
D. Constraining the Power of Congress
The Court has asserted that, aside from its role in constraining
the courts, standing prevents Congress from impairing the executive
power through the creation of private actions. Article II of the
Constitution vests the executive power in the President,165 and it
imposes on the President the obligation to “take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.”166 Relying on these provisions, the Court
asserted in Lujan that the Executive alone has the power to decide
how public law should be enforced and that Article III standing
protects this executive function.167 At issue in Lujan was the citizensuit provision of the Endangered Species Act authorizing private suits
to force the government to comply with the Act. Although the
provision authorizes “any person” to sue,168 the Court held that only a
person who has suffered an injury conferring standing could bring suit
under the law.169 The Court explained that allowing anyone to sue to

162. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (prohibiting delegation of
legislative power to private entity); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest:
Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1362 (1995) (“[S]tanding
forces . . . non-Condorcet minorities to seek codification of their preferences into law in
the legislature.”).
163. BICKEL, supra note 159, at 122–23.
164. See id.
165. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
166. Id. art. II, § 3.
167. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992). The Court has expressly
stated, however, that Article II is not the basis for standing. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 n.4 (1998) (“[O]ur standing jurisprudence[,] though it may
sometimes have an impact on Presidential powers, derives from Article III and not Article
II.”).
168. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2012).
169. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578.
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ensure executive officers’ compliance with the law would effectively
transfer from the President to the courts the power to execute the
laws, thereby converting the courts into “virtually continuing
monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”170
If one accepts the position that the Executive has the exclusive
power to vindicate the public interest,171 the Court’s worries in Lujan
are legitimate. For every executive action—be it a prosecutorial
decision, a rulemaking, or a proclamation of a national holiday—
there are individuals whom the action has upset. If Congress could
authorize any person to use the courts to oversee executive actions,
the Executive would become effectively subservient to the courts.
Standing protects against this threat by limiting the class of people
that Congress can authorize to challenge executive action.
That said, more recent decisions suggest that a majority of the
Court is no longer fully committed to the view that only the Executive
can vindicate the public interest. For example, in Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.,172 the Court held
that private individuals had standing by statute to seek civil penalties
paid to the United States against a factory that violated the Clean
Water Act.173 As several dissenting Justices noted, allowing private
individuals to seek public remedies arguably impairs the power of the
President to enforce the law.174 Moreover, in Vermont Agency of
National Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens,175 the Court upheld
the standing of private individuals suing as qui tam relators on behalf
of the United States for fraud against the government.176 Although
relators do not suffer harm themselves, the Court reasoned that they
have standing based on an assignment from the United States of its

170. Id. at 577.
171. Commentators have challenged this theory. See Elliott supra note 15, at 500
(arguing that standing does not reliably protect the President from Congress); Leah M.
Litman, Taking Care of Federal Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1289, 1337 (2015) (arguing that the
take care clause does not confer exclusive authority on the President to vindicate the
public interest); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42
DUKE L.J. 1141, 1142–43 (1993) (“The decision is difficult to square with the language and
history of Article III, with the injury requirement itself, with more modest visions of
judicial power, and with time-honored notions of public law litigation.”).
172. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
173. Id. at 186–88.
174. Id. at 198 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining that the majority approach
“marr[ies] private wrong with public remedy in a union that violates traditional principles
of federal standing—thereby permitting law enforcement to be placed in the hands of
private individuals”).
175. 592 U.S. 765 (2000).
176. Id. at 787.
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injury from the fraud.177 But under that reasoning, the relator is suing
to enforce a right traditionally enforced by the government.
These decisions suggest that, in some circumstances, the
Executive does not have the exclusive power to vindicate public
interests. But the effect of these decisions should not be overstated.
Nothing in these decisions suggests that the Executive does not have
exclusive power to vindicate other public interests, such as how to
enforce the criminal law. But they do establish that, for at least some
public interests, executive enforcement need not be exclusive and
therefore that standing does not serve the function of protecting the
Executive from Congress.
III. TAILORING STANDING
The various considerations of separation of powers undergirding
standing may justify imposing standing requirements in suits by
private individuals seeking to exercise the powers of other branches
of the federal government or to force those other branches to use
those powers. But, as this Part explains, those separation-of-powers
concerns do not extend to suits between private individuals seeking to
enforce private rights, nor do they apply to suits that seek to enforce
state public rights or to exercise the powers of state institutions.
Federal standing doctrine accordingly should not apply in those suits.
A. Private Suits Asserting Private Rights
The distinction between public and private rights still exists.178
Like their historical counterparts, private rights are those held by
individuals. These rights may derive from the common law, as with
the right to be free from trespass by others on one’s land. They also
may be created by Congress, as with the right not to be subject to
racial discrimination by motels.179 The Constitution also confers
various private rights. Although most constitutional provisions are
structural in that they dictate the scope of federal power or prescribe
the procedures for federal action, some provisions, such as the Fourth
Amendment restriction on unreasonable government searches and
seizures,180 confer rights on individuals.
177. Id. at 773.
178. See Hessick, supra note 23, at 286.
179. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201(a), 78 Stat. 241,
243 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012)) (“All persons shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the . . . accommodations of any place of public
accommodation . . . without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race . . . .”).
180. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Causes of action provide the means for vindicating private rights.
But those actions are distinct from the rights they protect.181 Rights
entitle individuals to be treated a particular way; a cause of action is
the mechanism to vindicate a right.182 Not all private causes of actions
enforce private rights. For example, the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”) requires agencies to follow particular procedures when
promulgating rules.183 The Act does not confer on individuals the
“right” to have agencies follow these procedures,184 but it does
authorize “aggrieved” individuals to file suit if the agency has not
followed them.185 In other words, the APA creates a private cause of
action under which individuals may vindicate a public interest.
Under current doctrine, for all suits, both those seeking to
vindicate private rights and those seeking to vindicate public rights,
an individual must establish standing by demonstrating an injury in
fact.186 Individual actions seeking to vindicate public rights may raise
the separation-of-powers concerns discussed above. But none of those
concerns apply to suits by private individuals seeking to vindicate
private rights. Accordingly, courts should not require plaintiffs
seeking to vindicate private rights to establish standing.
1. History
As previously explained, establishing standing was not
historically a prerequisite to obtaining judicial relief for the violation
of a private right. An individual could maintain an action to enforce
her private rights simply by invoking the appropriate form of action
and establishing that she was entitled to relief under that action. A
plaintiff’s failure to invoke a cause of action resulted in the dismissal
of his suit, as did the plaintiff’s failure to prove that he was entitled to
relief under that action.187

181. See Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 483 (2008) (stating that rights are
distinct from actions).
182. John F. Preis, How the Federal Cause of Action Relates to Rights, Remedies, and
Jurisdiction, 67 FLA. L. REV. 849, 850 (2016) (“A right is a claim to receive certain
treatment, and the cause of action is a tool for enforcing that claim in court.”).
183. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
184. Cf. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942) (stating that the
Communications Act creates a cause of action to force agencies to follow procedures but
does not “create new private rights” to those procedures).
185. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
186. See supra notes 25, 51 and accompanying text.
187. Garland v. Davis, 45 U.S. 131, 145 (1846) (allegations are subject to demur if
“wrong in form”).
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These dismissals were not for lack of jurisdiction, as is the case
today for dismissals for lack of standing;188 instead, they were
decisions on the merits.189 If a plaintiff failed to show that he was
entitled to relief under his action, the court would not dismiss on the
ground that the court lacked the power to determine whether the
plaintiff was entitled to relief. Rather, the dismissal was simply on the
ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish that he was entitled to
relief.
These deficiencies continue to be a basis for dismissal in federal
court today. A plaintiff asserting her rights in federal court today still
must establish that her rights have been violated and that a cause of
action entitles her to relief for that violation.190 The failure to do so
results in dismissal for failure to establish a claim to relief.191
To be sure, the law provides private rights today that did not
exist in the past. For example, individuals have a right against
securities fraud that goes beyond the protections of the common
law.192 But these rights are still private rights in that they are held by
individuals to protect personal interests,193 and the failure to establish
a personal violation of those rights is a basis for dismissal.194
Because plaintiffs in today’s federal judicial system must still
meet the historical requirements for maintaining suit, standing
doctrine is not essential to confining the federal judiciary to its
historical role in suits seeking to enforce private rights.
2. Protecting the Democratically Accountable Branches
The concern that the judiciary might usurp the power of the
political branches also does not support imposing standing in private
suits seeking to enforce private rights. By definition, claims that allege
violations of individual rights fall squarely within the Court’s view of
the judiciary’s “province” of “decid[ing] on the rights of
188. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109–10 (1998) (stating that
when a plaintiff “lacks standing” the courts “lack jurisdiction”).
189. Compare 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at *301 (pleas for lack of jurisdiction),
with id. at *293–300 (pleas challenging sufficiency of the action).
190. U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721 n.** (1990) (explaining that a
person may recover only for violation one’s of own rights, not those of a third party).
191. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
192. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005) (“Judicially
implied private securities fraud actions resemble in many (but not all) respects commonlaw deceit and misrepresentation actions.” (citations omitted)).
193. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975)
(recognizing a private right against securities fraud).
194. See Broudo, 544 U.S. at 343 (dismissing securities action for failure to state a
claim).
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individuals.”195 They do not seek to decide “abstract questions of wide
public significance” that should be directed to the political
branches.196
Nor does a private suit seeking to vindicate a private right seek
to use the courts to exercise a power reserved to the other branches.
Those suits do not ask courts to exercise the legislative power of
Congress. To the extent they involve legislation at all, they seek to
enforce rights that Congress has already created.197 Similarly, those
suits do not threaten the President’s Article II power to enforce the
law. Article II empowers the President to enforce public federal rights
in his capacity as the representative of the public.198 It does not
authorize him to enforce private rights held by private individuals.199
As John Marshall put it, a “private suit instituted by an individual,
asserting his claim to property, can only be controlled by that
individual. The executive can give no direction concerning it.”200

195. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (quoting Marbury v. Madison,
(1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)).
196. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).
197. See Sunstein, supra note 126, at 1472 (arguing that claims seeking to enforce
statutes do not usurp the political process because “the political resolution” is already
“expressed in law”). To be sure, resolving a suit alleging the violation of a federal
statutory right depends on the interpretation of a federal statute, and interpreting a statute
presents a potential interbranch conflict because the Court’s theory of interpretation
depends on its perception of the judiciary’s relationship with Congress. John F. Manning,
Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (2014) (stating that
the purpose of interpretation is to ascertain “what Congress actually decided or, in the
terms of the trade, ‘intended’ ”). But that conflict is not the kind of threat to separation of
powers against which standing seeks to guard. Standing seeks to prevent individuals from
using the courts to address social issues, not determine how courts should interpret
statutes. The theories of statutory interpretation, which separation of powers also informs,
handle that issue. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 56–57 (2001).
198. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (stating that “[v]indicating the public interest . . . is the
function of Congress and the Chief Executive”).
199. Cf. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607
(1982) (stating that the States cannot represent the rights of individuals); Pennsylvania v.
Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 316 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (recognizing the United States’s
standing to challenge violations of civil rights only insofar as the violation constitutes
“harm to interests shared by all members of the community”).
200. Representative John Marshall, Speech Delivered to the U.S. House of
Representatives on the Resolutions of the Honorable Edward Livingston, Relative to
Thomas Nash, Alias Jonathan Robbins (Mar. 7, 1800), in 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL 82, 99 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984) (1799–1800); see also JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 291 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690)
(stating that the right of “taking reparation [for violation of private right] . . . belongs only
to the injured party”) (emphasis removed).
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To be sure, the political branches can take steps to remedy the
violation of a private right. For example, Congress may enact private
legislation providing relief for the complaining party—such as a
statute directing the Treasury to disburse money to the
complainant.201 But that legislation does not vindicate the right that
has been violated; it creates a new entitlement for the beneficiary.202
Perhaps Congress could also enact legislation authorizing the
Executive to bring suit on behalf of an individual to seek a remedy for
the violation of that individual’s private rights.203 The right to be
enforced, however, would still be the private right held by the
individual. In bringing suit to vindicate that right, the Executive
would not be acting in its capacity to enforce public rights under
Article II; instead, it would be acting as a representative of the
individual whose right she seeks to vindicate, comparable to a
guardian bringing suit on behalf of its ward.204
Congress could also create a public right, held by the
government, prohibiting the same conduct underlying violation of the
private right. The creation of that public right would not destroy the
private right held by the person injured by the tortfeasor.205 (Of
course, Congress might be able to abrogate the private right
altogether. But in that case, the suit would no longer involve a private
right.) An individual could still bring suit to vindicate that private
right without interfering with the President’s power to enforce the
law.206
Because a party asserting private rights does not present a
relevant threat to the powers of Congress or the President, for those

201. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995) (“Private bills in
Congress are still common, and were even more so in the days before establishment of the
Claims Court.”).
202. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953) (noting that private bills create
entitlement to compensation).
203. But see LOCKE, supra note 200, at 291 (stating that the right of “taking reparation
[for violation of private right] . . . belongs only to the injured party” (emphasis removed)).
Such a statute would not be barred by restrictions on third-party standing, because thirdparty standing is a prudential doctrine that can be “abrogated by Congress.” Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (citing Warth v. Seldin 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
204. See, e.g., 39 AM. JUR. 2D Guardian and Ward § 1 (2008) (defining a guardian as
one appointed to care for the property interests of the ward).
205. See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 80, at 696 (explaining that malfeasance
potentially gives rise to both criminal actions and tort actions).
206. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at *118 (explaining that violent torts are
“always attended with some violation of the peace for which in strictness of law a fine
ought to be paid to the king”).
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types of claims, standing doctrine is not necessary to protect Congress
or the President.207
One might argue, even if standing is unnecessary in suits to
enforce private statutory or common law rights, it is nevertheless
essential for claims challenging the constitutionality of an act of
another branch of the federal government. That is because a
determination of unconstitutionality effectively results in the court
revising the actions of the other government branch.208 A ruling that a
federal law is unconstitutional results in the court voiding
congressional legislation and telling Congress the limits of its
legislative power;209 similarly, a determination that an executive
officer’s action was unconstitutional effectively enjoins the Executive
from using its power as it sees fit in the future.210 Concerns of this sort
have prompted the Court to say that the “standing inquiry [is]
especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute” and
entails deciding “whether an action taken by one of the other two
branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.”211
These concerns may justify a rigorous standing requirement for
claims invoking structural provisions of the Constitution, such as the
requirements that laws must pass both houses of Congress to be
valid212 or that a federal law be justified by an enumerated power in
the Constitution, such as the commerce clause.213 Those provisions do
not confer a right on any individual but instead establish how the
branches of government should operate and the limits of its power.214

207. Suits against private individuals may implicate important federal interests—for
example, the liability of private actors performing government contracts. See Boyle v.
United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988). But the presence of a federal interest does
not suggest that the federal courts should be more hesitant to act. To the contrary,
protecting a federal interest is reason for more aggressive federal judicial intervention.
Indeed, federal courts have offered the presence of a federal interest as a justification to
create federal common law. See id. at 504–06 (holding that important federal interest
justified creation of federal common law).
208. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 152 (1893) (arguing that judicial review gives
“judges . . . the power to revise the action of other departments”).
209. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (“[A] law repugnant to the
constitution is void[.]”).
210. See, e.g., Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 635–36 (2002) (holding unconstitutional
search supported by probable cause but conducted without warrant).
211. E.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (discussing the
purpose of standing doctrine).
212. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
213. Id. art. I, § 8.
214. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 575–76 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (distinguishing between structural provisions and “rights”); Aziz Z. Huq,
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Accordingly, under the Court’s vision of separation of powers,
enforcement of these provisions should be left to the political
branches unless an individual establishes an injury supporting
standing.215
But these concerns do not justify imposing a standing
requirement on plaintiffs asserting private constitutional rights, such
as their Fourth Amendment right against an unreasonable seizure.216
A private right deriving from the Constitution is still a private right.217
Such rights are held by each individual, and the violation of an
individual’s right may provide the basis for recovery.218 Resolving
claims asserting private constitutional rights thus falls squarely within
the federal judiciary’s core function of deciding on rights of
individuals. Accordingly, even though the decision may limit the
power of Congress or the Executive, it does not involve resolving a
dispute more appropriately addressed to the other branches of
government.219
To be sure, as a prudential matter, courts might want to avoid
resolving cases that pass on the constitutionality of the actions of the
other branches, even though they clearly have the power to do so.220
A determination that another branch acted unconstitutionally raises
the possibility that unelected judges are implementing their policy
preferences instead of those enacted by elected branches.221 It also
creates a confrontation between the branches and potentially signifies

Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1514–15 (2013) (arguing that
structural constitutional principles are not individualistic rights).
215. See supra notes 103–11 and accompanying text.
216. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
395 (1971).
217. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27
GA. L. REV. 343, 351–52 (1993) (discussing private rights endowed by the Constitution
and the interests those rights protect).
218. See, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395 (affording damages remedy for violation of
constitutional rights).
219. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 168 (1803) (concluding that an
injury to a private right justifies a remedy even when doing so limits powers of other
branches).
220. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (listing instances in which courts should avoid constitutional questions in
cases in which they possess jurisdiction); Hessick, supra note 13, at 95–96 (arguing that
comity should be a basis for declining jurisdiction).
221. See Lino A. Graglia, Judicial Review on the Basis of “Regime Principles”: A
Prescription for Government by Judges, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 435, 451 (1985) (noting the threat
that “judicial review amounts simply to law-making according to the preferences of
unelected government officials holding office for life.”).
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disrespect of that other branch’s judgment.222 These concerns are
particularly acute in cases involving core executive functions, such as
foreign affairs or the military. But these concerns do not bear on
whether a dispute can be resolved by a federal court—that is, whether
the dispute involves “decid[ing] on the rights of individuals”;223 rather,
they go only to whether the court should resolve the dispute.
Another potential objection is that, when a plaintiff seeks a
remedy for a potential future violation of her rights, standing plays an
important role in protecting the roles of the elected branches.
Although courts can provide prospective relief to remedy threatened
harms, limiting standing to those who can establish that the threat of
injury is “real and immediate”224 confines courts to their appropriate
role. Allowing a person to bring suit based on a remote risk of injury
would effectively enable courts to resolve generalized grievances
because everyone faces at least some probability of suffering a rights
violation.225
But as I have explained elsewhere, the separation-of-powers
concerns underlying standing do not warrant distinguishing between
large and small risks of harm.226 That is because any threatened
violation of a private right is particularized. A person who faces a
small risk of being assaulted, for example, has a personalized interest
in preventing that assault. Setting the probability threshold extremely
low may vastly expand the number of people who have standing. But
each of those people has a personalized interest in not being
assaulted.227 Because separation of powers does not justify treating
those risks of harm differently, standing is unnecessary to weed out
low probability risks of harm.
Of course, saying that standing is an unnecessary inquiry in suits
raising private rights requires one to determine whether the law
222. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (avoiding declarations of
unconstitutionality out of “[d]ue respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of
Government” (citations omitted)).
223. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 168). To be sure, under the political question doctrine, courts lack the power to
address some constitutional issues. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993). But
that doctrine is limited to the few issues that the Constitution entrusts exclusively to
another branch. See id. at 228–29.
224. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (citations omitted).
225. See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1295
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (arguing that “remote and speculative [claims] are properly left to the
policymaking Branches,” because otherwise “virtually any citizen” would have standing to
challenge government action).
226. Hessick, supra note 13, at 85.
227. Id. at 87.
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confers an individual right or instead establishes a regulatory
prohibition on particular action. Often it is easy to determine whether
a law establishes an individual right or establishes a prohibition that
protects the public interest—the Fourth Amendment, for example,
clearly provides an individual right against unreasonable searches and
seizures,228 while the constitutional provisions regulating
impeachment clearly outline structural limitations.229 But for other
provisions it may not be so clear.230 The difficulty of resolving this
question does not justify extending standing’s requirements to all
cases; rather, it justifies requiring a plaintiff claiming that he is
asserting a private right to establish that he is indeed asserting a
private right and therefore need not establish standing. Moreover,
courts regularly resolve whether particular laws confer rights or
establish structural requirements in a number of contexts aside from
standing. For example, courts must resolve the same question in cases
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which affords a remedy against state
officials only for the deprivation of an “individual” right under the
Constitution,231 and pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,232 which provides analogous
remedies against federal officials.233 Those decisions often settle
whether a law confers a right, making it unnecessary to reconsider the
matter.234
3. Protecting Legitimacy
As explained earlier, standing is not a sensible tool to protect
judicial legitimacy.235 Judicial legitimacy turns much more on the
issues in a case and the way in which a court decides those issues,
rather than whether the appropriate person raised the issue before
the court.236 But even accepting the claim that standing protects
legitimacy, standing is not necessary to protect judicial legitimacy in
suits alleging the violation of private rights because those suits do not
raise relevant concerns about judicial legitimacy.

228. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
229. Id. art. I, §§ 2–3.
230. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 187 n.6 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (raising this concern).
231. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284–85 (2002).
232. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
233. See id. at 389, 396.
234. Id. at 388–89.
235. See supra notes 137–53 and accompanying text.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 150–53.
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Recall that the theory is that standing protects judicial legitimacy
by indicating to the public that courts do not simply provide legal
advice but act only when necessary to protect individual rights.237
There is usually little public interest in run-of-the-mill tort suits
between two private parties. Over a thousand torts suits are filed in
federal court each year.238 Yet one does not hear about trial court
rulings in private suits unless the suits involve a widespread injury like
a toxic tort, the suits result in huge verdicts, or one of the parties is
famous—much less about claims that trial decisions in private suits
are illegitimate because of a lack of standing.239
Suits involving private constitutional rights may garner greater
public attention. For example, there were a number of media reports
on the lawsuit challenging the refusal of Kim Davis, a Kentucky
county clerk, to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.240 But
those suits are the exception rather than the norm, given the large
number of suits involving private constitutional rights filed each year
that do not receive public attention.241
More importantly, standing is simply unnecessary in suits
alleging violations of private rights to protect judicial legitimacy in the
sense described by the Court. In the Court’s view, the role of the
judiciary is to act when necessary to protect individual rights.242 That
is precisely what a court does when a person alleges the violation of a
private right. Of course, the plaintiff will not win if she fails to
establish that her rights have been violated. But denying relief on that
ground does not undermine judicial legitimacy in the sense that the

237. See supra text accompanying notes 132–234.
238. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, TABLE C-2: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL
CASES COMMENCED, BY BASIS OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF SUIT, DURING THE
12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING MARCH 31, 2013 AND 2014, at 1 (2014), http://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/C02Mar14.pdf [https://perma.cc
/RL67-WF89].
239. Searches in the “News and Journals” and “Law Reviews” databases of Westlaw
conducted in February 2017 revealed no claims that a district court ruling in a private suit
was illegitimate, for lack of standing or otherwise.
240. See, e.g., Couple Who Sued Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis Marry, 6ABC (Oct. 25,
2015), http://6abc.com/news/couple-who-sued-kentucky-clerk-kim-davis-marry/1050560/
[http://perma.cc/KV2P-5L3M].
241. In 2014, prisoners filed over 39,000 civil rights or habeas suits and in total plaintiffs
filed over 35,000 civil rights suits. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, TABLE C-2: U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, BY BASIS OF JURISDICTION AND
NATURE OF SUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 AND
2014, at 2–3 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir
/C02Sep14.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ARD-KD24]. Although not all of these suits involved
constitutional claims, it stands to reason that many did.
242. See supra text accompanying note 112.

95 N.C. L. REV. 673 (2017)

2017]

ARTICLE III STANDING

711

court has gone beyond its appropriate sphere. In that case, the court
has determined that an award is not necessary to protect individual
rights.
4. Protecting the Executive from Congress
Standing requirements are also not necessary in private-rights
suits to prevent Congress from eroding the President’s Article II
power to enforce the law. Article II authorizes the President to
enforce public rights; it does not empower the President to vindicate
private rights.243
That said, as noted above, Congress may be able to authorize the
President to enforce private rights by statute, and it certainly may
create a public right that runs parallel to a private right.244 For
example, Congress may enact a criminal law prohibiting breaches of
contracts occurring in interstate commerce that accompanies the
private action for breach of contract. But in private suits seeking to
enforce a private instead of a parallel public right, standing is
unnecessary to guard against congressional commandeering of
executive power.245
This is not to say that there are no limits on Congress’s power to
create private rights. Congress cannot create private rights if doing so
violates some other constitutional provision. For example, if Article II
vests exclusive power in the President to enforce public rights,
Congress cannot create a private right to compel the President to
enforce public rights.246 But these limitations on Congress’s power do
not flow from Article III. Although Lujan suggests that Article III
prohibits federal courts from hearing private suits to enforce public
rights even when Congress has authorized those suits,247 nothing in
Lujan or other opinions suggests that Article III defines what
constitutes a private right or a public right. Instead, the limitations on
243. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607
(1982) (stating that for a state to have standing, “[it] must articulate an interest apart from
the interests of particular private parties”); see also United States v. City of Philadelphia,
644 F.2d 187, 200–03 (3d Cir. 1980) (refusing to infer implied right of action for the United
States under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce individual rights).
244. See Sunstein, supra note 91, at 231 n.300 (“Parallel public and private remedies
are most familiar to American law; they do not violate the Constitution.”).
245. See Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 159, 203 (2011) (arguing standing is proper for private enforcement of private rights
but possibly not for private enforcement of parallel public right).
246. F. Andrew Hessick, Understanding Standing, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 195, 205
(2015).
247. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576–77 (1992) (contrasting between
suits to vindicate individuals’ rights and suits to vindicate the public interest).
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what private rights Congress may create must come from other
provisions in the Constitution.
B.

Suits Asserting State Interests

A second category of suits in which Article III standing is
unnecessary are those seeking to assert state interests. These include
suits seeking to force the state government to comply with the law or
to exercise one of its powers, as well as suits seeking to exercise a
power of the state governments. These “state interest” suits are the
state analog of those federal suits that do raise the kinds of
separation-of-powers concerns underlying standing. But they do not
threaten the separation of powers because they do not implicate the
other branches of the federal government; instead, the only sovereign
interests at stake are those of the state. Accordingly, if Article III
standing rests on separation of powers, establishing standing is
unnecessary in those cases.
1. History
State-interest suits are analogous to the historical category of
suits seeking to vindicate public interests. Citizens of a state share a
collective interest in protecting the state’s interests, ensuring state
government compliance with the law, and seeing the state’s criminal
and other public laws enforced.
As noted above, historically, the representative of the public had
the primary responsibility of enforcing public rights.248 But the
legislature could authorize public rights that individuals could
enforce.249 Although the Supreme Court has concluded that
individuals generally cannot enforce federal public rights,250 states
have been less restrictive about the enforcement of state public rights.
Many states permit broad private enforcement of public rights. For
instance, thirty-six states allow taxpayer standing,251 and a number of
other states waive standing requirements in cases that raise an
important public interest.252 Moreover, a number of states have
248. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
249. Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 80, at 694.
250. See supra notes 39–46 and accompanying text.
251. Joshua G. Urquhart, Disfavored Constitution, Passive Virtues? Linking State
Constitutional Fiscal Limitations and Permissive Taxpayer Standing Doctrines, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 1263, 1277 (2012).
252. See, e.g., Youngblood v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 741 S.E.2d 515, 518 (S.C. 2013)
(recognizing “public importance exception” (citing Freemantle v. Preston, 728 S.E.2d 40,
43 (S.C. 2012))); Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1104 (Utah 2013) (waiving standing
in suit of “significant public importance” (quoting Cedar Mountain Envtl., Inc. v. Tooele
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concluded that standing is a prudential doctrine subject to
modification by the state legislature.253
Allowing federal courts to hear suits by private individuals to
enforce state public rights under these state doctrines is entirely
consistent with historical practice. It does not result in the courts
hearing suits that they traditionally could not hear because the
relevant sovereign has authorized private enforcement of public
rights.254
To be sure, one might argue that enforcing Article III standing
doctrine is essential to limiting federal courts to their historical role
when state law does not authorize private enforcement of public
rights. But historically those suits would have been dismissed on the
ground that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that he was entitled to
the remedy requested,255 not that the court lacked the power to decide
whether the plaintiff was entitled to the remedy.256 Federal courts
continue to be able to dismiss suits on that ground today: a plaintiff
cannot maintain an action under a law that does not entitle the
plaintiff to relief.257
More importantly, the rationale for using Article III standing to
limit federal courts to the historical role of courts does not apply to
cases raising state public rights. The reason for limiting federal courts

County ex rel. Tooele Cty. Comm’n, 214 P.3d 95, 98 (Utah 2009))); To-Ro Trade Shows v.
Collins, 27 P.3d 1149, 1155 (Wash. 2001) (waiving standing when “the interest of the
public . . . is overwhelming” (quoting In re Deming, 736 P.2d 639, 660 (Wash. 1987) (en
banc) (Utter, J., concurring)).
253. See, e.g., Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 699
(Mich. 2010) (calling standing “prudential”); Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 167 P.3d 292,
312 (Haw. 2007) (describing “standing doctrine” as “prudential rules of judicial selfgovernance”); Stuart Kingston, Inc. v. Robinson, 596 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Del. 1991)
(“Standing [is] a matter of self-restraint . . . .”).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 87–88.
255. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Norwich & Worcester R.R., 17 Conn. 372, 376 (1845)
(concluding that a plaintiff without special injury seeking an injunction for a public
nuisance is “not entitled to relief”); see also Barr v. Stevens, 4 Ky. 292, 292–93 (1808)
(affirming order relating to nuisance, as opposed to dismissing appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, on the ground that the appellants were not specially harmed)
256. Compare 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at *219–20 (stating that “no [private]
actions lies for a public or common nuisance”), and 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 922 (stating that the proper
“remedy” for public nuisance is suit by the government), with 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note
79, at *301 (pleas for lack of jurisdiction), and 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 921, (13th ed. 1886) (noting
the “jurisdiction” of chancery courts over public nuisances).
257. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). One might try to extend this same reasoning to
federal public rights. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 20, at 236 (arguing that standing should
be a merits question).
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to their historical role is to prevent those courts from infringing on
the domains of the other branches of the federal government.258 That
concern does not apply to suits seeking to vindicate state public
rights. The President does not have the power to enforce state public
rights.259 Nor does Congress have any say over the content of state
public rights.260 Instead, in suits seeking to vindicate state public
rights, the only sovereign interests at stake are those of the state.
Instead of involving separation of powers, the argument that
federal courts should refuse to hear unauthorized private suits
seeking to enforce state public rights sounds in federalism. Denying
standing in those cases enforces the state arrangement of power
among its branches of government, not the federal allocation of
power.261 It accordingly is not compelled by the separation-of-powers
argument underlying Article III standing. At most, those concerns
may provide prudential grounds for a federal court to decline to hear
a case to avoid undermining the state’s scheme for enforcing its public
rights.262
2. Protecting the Democratically Accountable Branches
Article III standing also does not serve to protect the power of
the other federal branches of government in suits asserting state
interests. As noted above, the enforcement of state rights or exercise
of state powers does not implicate the powers of the President or
Congress.263 The creation of state public rights and how those rights
are enforced are decisions solely for the state. Accordingly, for those
state law disputes, standing is not necessary to protect the other
branches of the federal government.
One might argue that the Article III standing doctrine
nevertheless is necessary to prevent judiciary encroachment of the
258. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009) (“[L]imiting the
judicial power . . . to the traditional role of Anglo-American courts . . . . ‘is founded in
concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic
society.’ ” (quoting Warth v. Seldin 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)))
259. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525 (2008) (noting the President’s inability to
control enforcement of state law when no federal law is implicated).
260. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997) (holding that Congress
cannot direct enactment of state laws).
261. Hessick, supra note 9, at 101 (stating that federal justiciability doctrines “enforce
the federal allocation of power” that “[m]any states have rejected”).
262. Cf., e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (directing federal courts to
abstain from issuing injunctions barring state criminal prosecutions); La. Power & Light
Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959) (requiring abstention in cases that implicate an
important “sovereign prerogative” and in which state law is unclear).
263. See supra notes 258–60 and accompanying text.
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elected branches of the state governments. That argument is based on
federalism instead of separation of powers. It seeks to avoid federal
interference with the state’s administration of its affairs,264 instead of
seeking to define the allocation of power among the branches of the
federal government.265
The Supreme Court has not invoked federalism as a rationale for
standing; instead, it has insisted on grounding standing in separation
of powers even in suits that raise only federalism concerns. For
example, in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn,266
the Court denied taxpayer standing to challenge a state tax.267 It
explained that “[t]he legislative and executive departments of the
Federal Government, no less than the judicial department, have a
duty to defend the Constitution”268 and therefore the federal courts
lack “unconditioned authority to determine the constitutionality of
[state] legislative or executive acts.”269
This conclusion is a non sequitur. That the President and
Congress have a duty to defend the Constitution has no bearing on
the relationship between the federal courts and the states. Article III
standing enforces the federal allocation of power among the courts,
Executive, and legislature.270 That effort to protect the division of
federal powers does not translate into protecting federalism. Many
states have adopted distributions of power among their governmental
departments that differ from the federal arrangement.271 Some states
do not place all executive power in a single office but instead disperse
it among several elected officials; some allow direct participation of
their citizens through popular referenda; and some confer more
power on their judges because those judges are subject to elections.272
Because of these differences and others, various states have

264. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) (stating federalism refers to state
and national governments as “joint participants in the governance of the Nation”
(citations omitted)).
265. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 699 (1997) (“The doctrine of separation of
powers is concerned with the allocation of official power among the three coequal
branches of our Government.”).
266. 563 U.S. 125 (2011).
267. Id. at 130.
268. Id. at 133 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3).
269. Id. (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982)).
270. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (noting that justiciability “define[s] the role
assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power” among the judiciary, the
President, and Congress).
271. See Hershkoff, supra note 137 at 1886–96.
272. See id. (giving examples of states with these characteristics).
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developed different standing doctrines, and many of these doctrines
allow for broader enforcement of public rights.273 Applying Article III
standing to suits seeking to enforce state public rights therefore does
not faithfully protect the decisions of the state about when an
individual may appropriately invoke the judicial power.274
Far from undermining federalism, dispensing with Article III
standing in private suits seeking to enforce state public rights may
promote federalism. Imposing federal standing requirements in those
cases may prohibit suit when the state would permit it. Applying
federal standing doctrine interferes with these state schemes for
directing which institution―the judiciary or a political body—should
decide particular disputes.
The Article III restriction on taxpayer standing for state
taxpayers provides an example. As noted earlier, most states allow
taxpayer standing to challenge unlawful activity.275 Various reasons
justify that decision. The states may have concluded that allowing
private enforcement actions is the best way to vindicate the public
right to government compliance with the law, or that private
enforcement is essential for providing an avenue to challenge
unlawful actions that do not hurt anyone in particular. But federal
courts have refused to apply those state taxpayer standing rules, and
instead have held that state taxpayer status does not confer Article III
standing.276 Prohibiting those taxpayers from proceeding in federal
court undermines the state’s interest in allowing those suits.277 It
impairs the enforcement of state interests in federal court.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 251–52.
274. Although justiciability doctrines do not seek to promote federalism, courts may
use justiciability doctrines to protect state interests. See Taub v. Kentucky, 842 F.2d 912,
919 (6th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that justiciability doctrines were not created with
federalism in mind, but explaining that justiciability could nevertheless be used to further
federalism). But that practice does not establish that standing is designed to protect
federalism; it shows only that courts may use the doctrine to protect federalism. See
Hessick, supra note 9, at 102 n.303.
275. See supra text accompanying note 252.
276. See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989) (“[W]e have likened
state taxpayers to federal taxpayers, and thus we have refused to confer standing upon a
state taxpayer absent a showing of ‘direct injury[.]’ ” (quoting Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of
Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952))); Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 683
(9th Cir. 2001) (denying standing to California taxpayers for state law claims, despite
acknowledging that California recognizes taxpayer standing).
277. Although federal standing should not apply to cases assessing the constitutionality
of state laws, federal courts perhaps should apply state standing doctrines as a matter of
comity to avoid unnecessary conflicts with state governments. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (invoking comity in abstaining from ruling on legality of state criminal
proceedings). Federal courts accordingly should abstain from hearing a state case when
state standing laws would not permit the same suit to go forward in state court.
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The Court’s denial of standing in Hollingsworth v. Perry provides
another example of how Article III standing may undermine state
interests.278 There, after the executive department of California
refused to appeal a federal district court’s ruling that Proposition 8
was unconstitutional, the State of California explicitly authorized the
official proponents of Proposition 8 to appeal the ruling on behalf of
California.279 Despite that authorization, the Supreme Court held that
the proponents lacked Article III standing to pursue the appeal.280
That determination impaired California’s ability to pursue its
interests. The referenda process allows the citizens of California to
enact laws that California’s political officials refuse to enact.281
Allowing the proponents to represent California’s interest in
defending the law if California’s officials refuse to do so provided a
way of preventing officials from undermining the referendum
process.282 In other words, the Hollingsworth decision removed one of
California’s critical mechanisms for defending the constitutionality of
its referenda. Moreover, by denying standing to the proponents, the
Supreme Court deprived the voters of California of a central means
contemplated by the State of challenging the district court ruling that
their proposition was unconstitutional.283
One might contend that this argument justifies dispensing with
standing in suits that raise challenges under state laws or
constitutions, but not in suits raising federal constitutional challenges
to state laws because constitutional determinations about state laws
may apply to federal laws in future cases.284 This concern does not
apply to private rights conferred by the Constitution. As explained
above, suits alleging violations of private rights do not present a
relevant threat to the other branches of government.285 But the
concern may apply to structural provisions. The Constitution imposes
several structural constraints on the states. For example, Article I,
Section 10 prohibits the states from engaging in a handful of actions,
278. 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013).
279. Id. at 2660.
280. Id. at 2662.
281. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1006 (Cal. 2011) (“[T]he initiative process is
specifically intended to enable the people to amend the state Constitution or to enact
statutes when current government officials have declined to adopt . . . the measure . . . .”).
282. Id. at 1024 (“The initiative power would be significantly impaired if there were no
one to assert the state’s interest in the validity of the measure when elected officials
decline to defend it in court or to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure.”).
283. See Elliott, supra note 12, at 446.
284. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 759 (2010) (noting that
incorporated rights apply equally to state and federal governments).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 217–19.
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such as entering into treaties, coining money, or keeping troops
during peacetime except with Congress’s consent.286 But almost none
of the structural constraints imposed on the states in the Constitution
apply to the federal government. Some, like those in Article I,
prohibit the states from engaging in certain acts because those acts
are reserved to Congress;287 others oblige the states to follow certain
procedures inapplicable to the federal government;288 and still others
establish obligations between the states that do not apply to the
federal government.289 The only exception is that the Constitution
prohibits both the federal government and the states from granting
titles of nobility.290
More importantly, the possibility that a ruling against a state
might establish precedent applicable against the federal government
does not raise the kinds of separation-of-powers concerns that
underlie Article III standing. The purpose of standing is to limit the
occasions when federal courts may exercise the Article III “judicial
Power.”291 According to the Court, “the ‘judicial Power’ is one to
render dispositive judgments.”292 Judgments are the means by which
courts resolve cases and controversies. They settle the rights and
obligations of the respective parties. Standing assures that the dispute
before the court is a case or controversy susceptible to resolution by a
dispositive judgment. Standing thus “identif[ies] those disputes which
are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.”293

286. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., id. art. II, § 1 (defining the states’ role in electing the President).
289. See id. art. IV, §§ 1–2 (requiring each state to give full faith and credit to the acts
of other states, and to return fugitives from another state at the latter’s request).
290. Id. art. I, §§ 9–10. The commerce clause imposes a structural limitation on both
the federal government and the states. It authorizes the federal government to regulate
only interstate, foreign, and Indian commerce. Id. art. I, § 8. The dormant commerce
clause prohibits states from discriminating against out-of-state commerce, see Comptroller
of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015), or unduly burdening interstate
commerce, see General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997). Although the
scope of power granted to Congress used to be tied to the scope of the limits on the states
under the clause (whatever Congress could regulate, the states could not, and vice versa),
see Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 448 (1827), the two are no longer mirror images, see
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992) (noting the evolution of the
doctrine). Therefore, determinations about one do not affect the other.
291. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 341 (1988).
292. Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 717 (2011) (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995)).
293. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (emphasis added)
(quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
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Unlike the resolution of disputes through judgments, creating
law through opinions is not an exercise of the judicial power.294
Opinions are merely by-products of the exercise of the judicial power
of resolving disputes.295 Their function is to provide explanations for
the judgments that resolve cases and controversies, but opinions do
not themselves resolve cases and controversies.296 Indeed, federal
courts may issue judgments without opinion if they so choose.297 And
they regularly discuss in opinions matters unnecessary to the
judgment, even when that discussion is on constitutional issues that
may affect the federal government in future cases.298
Because judicial lawmaking is not an exercise of the judicial
power, standing does not seek to limit it. It is for this reason that the
same standing doctrine that applies in district courts applies in the
circuit courts and the Supreme Court. Although district courts lack
the power to create law, they exercise the judicial power of rendering
dispositive judgments.
3. Protecting Legitimacy
Suits involving the vindication of state interests often garner
substantial public attention, at least among the residents of that state
who may be affected by the decision. But the legitimacy of a federal
court’s ruling in such a case does not turn on whether the plaintiff has
Article III standing. That is not only because, as noted earlier,
standing has little bearing on legitimacy.299 It is also because Article
III does not limit the states,300 and many states have developed
standing rules that differ from the federal ones or have concluded that

294. Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 123, 126–27 (1999) (“[O]pinions . . . are not necessary to the judicial function of
deciding cases and controversies.”).
295. See Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001,
1006 (1965) (“Federal Courts . . . do not pass on constitutional questions because there is a
special function vested in them to enforce the Constitution . . . . They do so rather for the
reason that they must decide a litigated issue that is otherwise within their jurisdiction and
in doing so must give effect to the supreme law of the land.”).
296. Hartnett, supra note 294, at 126 (“The operative legal act performed by a court is
the entry of a judgment; an opinion is simply an explanation of reasons for that
judgment.”).
297. See, e.g., King v. Ill. Bd. of Elections, 522 U.S. 1087, 1087 (1998) (affirming lower
court decision without opinion).
298. Leval, supra note 147, at 1269–73 (noting the widespread acceptance of dicta on
constitutional issues).
299. See supra notes 137–64 and accompanying test.
300. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“[T]he constraints of Article
III do not apply to state courts . . . .”).
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it is crucial not to have a limitation on judicial power.301 Those rules
establish the situations under which the states have deemed it
appropriate for courts to rule on their state laws.302 Nothing suggests
that those state rules have undermined the legitimacy of the state
courts. To the contrary, people in those states expect judicial action
when the state rules of justiciability are satisfied.
One might argue that requiring a plaintiff to establish Article III
standing to vindicate a state interest is more important to maintaining
the legitimacy of federal courts than of state courts because a ruling
of the federal court involves federal intrusions into state laws. That
argument sounds in federalism instead of separation of powers and
accordingly is not what has driven standing doctrine. Moreover,
limiting standing to those who satisfy the Article III test as opposed
to the state test for standing may imperil the legitimacy of the federal
court insofar as it may be seen as the application of federal law at the
expense of state interests.303 In Hollingsworth, for example, the denial
of Article III standing to the proponents of Proposition 8 after the
Supreme Court of California stated that they could defend the
proposition on behalf of the State impaired California’s ability to
defend its laws, no doubt upsetting those Californians who supported
the proposition.304
4. Protecting the Executive from Congress
Standing is also not necessary in suits involving state interests to
prevent Congress from encroaching on the President’s Article II
enforcement power. Suits seeking to vindicate state interests do not
implicate Article II. Article II does not authorize the President to
enforce state public rights or otherwise vindicate state interests.305
The state has sole control over the enforcement of its laws. Because
the President has no power to vindicate state interests, it is not
necessary to use Article III standing to prevent Congress from
interfering with the President’s enforcement power in those cases.

301. Hessick, supra note 9, at 66–67 (gathering different state standing rules).
302. See id. at 95–98 (explaining that state justiciability rules reflect state
determinations of when adjudication is appropriate).
303. Cf. Todd C. Berg, Experts Say Critics of Michigan Supreme Court’s Environmental
Law Ruling Are Wrong, MICH. LAW. WKLY., Oct. 15, 2007, 2007 WLNR 30394644
(reporting criticisms of the Michigan Supreme Court for adopting restrictive standing
requirement).
304. See supra text accompanying notes 278–83.
305. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525 (2008) (noting the President’s inability to
control enforcement of state law when no federal law is implicated).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
Eliminating the standing inquiry in private-rights and stateinterest suits would have at least two consequences. First, it would
obviously prevent those types of cases from being dismissed for lack
of standing. Second, it would reduce discrepancies in standing law and
potentially increase the stringency of standing’s requirements in suits
that do threaten the separation of powers.
A. Removing the Standing Obstacle
The most obvious effect of eliminating Article III standing
requirements in private-rights and state-interest suits is that it would
prevent those suits from being dismissed on standing grounds. Thus,
standing would no longer pose an obstacle in suits in which
individuals assert individual rights. Decisions such as City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, in which the Court denied standing to an individual
who sought an injunction barring police from using a chokehold that
he claimed violated the Fourth Amendment,306 would not be
dismissed for lack of standing. Similarly, standing would no longer
pose a bar in state taxpayer suits, like Arizona Christian School
Tuition Organization v. Winn,307 or in suits seeking to defend state
laws, like Hollingsworth v. Perry.308
Eliminating standing as a threshold inquiry in these cases would
remove a substantial obstacle preventing many litigants from
obtaining the relief that they request. As many scholars have argued,
courts often use standing to achieve particular outcomes.309 For
example, several scholars have argued that the Court denied standing
in Hollingsworth to avoid ruling that the Constitution obligates the
states to recognize gay marriage.310
Of course, dispensing with Article III standing may not change
the ultimate outcome in many suits, because many individuals who
306. 461 U.S. 95, 106, 111–12 (1983).
307. 563 U.S. 125, 130 (2011).
308. 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661, 2667–68 (2013).
309. See Elliott, supra note 245, at 171–72 (recounting arguments that standing allows
courts “to manipulate outcomes”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77
N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1758 (1999) (describing standing as a “tool[] to further [judges’]
ideological agendas”).
310. See Fallon, supra note 49, at 1100 (arguing that the Court may have denied
standing in Hollingsworth “to avoid a ruling on the merits of that case”); Michael J.
Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV.
127, 146 (2013) (asserting that the Court in Hollingsworth likely avoided the constitutional
issue because some of the Justices “were not yet prepared to impose gay marriage on the
states”).
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lack standing will run into other legal barriers to their claims. Most
prominently, many individuals lack standing because they fail to state
an actionable claim.311 To have Article III standing under current
doctrine, a plaintiff must allege a judicially cognizable injury, and
whether an injury is judicially cognizable turns on whether the law
confers a right on the plaintiff to seek redress for that injury.312 If an
injury is not judicially cognizable, it does not provide a basis for
seeking redress. For example, the Court has denied standing to
plaintiffs seeking information from the government under the
expenditures clause of the Constitution,313 but found standing for
plaintiffs seeking information from the government under the Federal
Election Campaign Act (“FECA”).314 The only relevant difference
between those decisions is that FECA provides a private right to
information while the expenditures clause does not.315 Because the
expenditures clause does not create a right to the information, the
plaintiff would not be entitled to the information under the
expenditures clause, even if standing were established.
But dismissing those suits on the merits instead of on standing
would have several effects. First, it would improve conceptual clarity.
Because standing inherently involves questions about the substantive
rights at stake,316 efforts to keep standing separate from the merits
have resulted in standing doctrine becoming incoherent and
confusing.317 Eliminating the standing inquiry would ameliorate this

311. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 236. Another barrier applies to individuals seeking
an injunction. A plaintiff may obtain an injunction only to prevent “a probable ground of
possible injury.” 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS, AND THE
INCIDENTS THEREOF, ACCORDING TO THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF EQUITY OF
ENGLAND AND AMERICA, ch. 2, § 9, at 9 (10th ed. 1892). A party who lacks standing to
challenge a threatened injury because the risk is not “real” likely does not face a probable
ground of injury. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 160 (1990).
312. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996) (denying standing to inmate for
denial of access to law library, because the inmate had no right to a law library). The
overlap between standing doctrine and the need to state a claim is unsurprising given that
the two doctrines serve the same purpose. The function of standing is to ensure that the
judiciary stays within its “province . . . to decide on the rights of individuals[,]” Lujan v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 170 (1803), and the function of the requirement that the plaintiff allege a claim
entitling him to relief is to allow courts to provide relief only to vindicate individual rights.
313. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179–80 (1974).
314. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–21 (1998).
315. See Hessick, supra note 23, at 306.
316. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 236.
317. Nichol, supra note 171, at 115–60.
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problem. It would also save the resources that parties spend litigating,
and courts spend resources resolving, standing issues.318
Second, dismissing these suits on the merits instead of on
standing grounds could improve judicial legitimacy. Instead of being
perceived as avoiding vindicating substantive rights through an easily
manipulated standing doctrine,319 courts would confront the question
about the scope of the substantive rights at issue. To be sure,
resolving the case on the merits would not result in the plaintiff
receiving relief, and in some circumstances, forcing courts to address
substantive rights may result in a narrowing of those rights to avoid
awarding intolerable remedies that they previously avoided through
standing.320 But it would at least prevent the impression that the
courts are trying to avoid the merits.
Third, dismissing these suits on the merits would expand the
power of Congress and state legislatures. Article III is a constitutional
limitation on the courts that legislatures cannot change. But
legislatures can define the scope of substantive rights and say who
may enforce those rights. Thus, if a court determines that existing
rights do not provide a basis for relief, a legislature may overturn that
decision by creating a new right. Even when the dismissed claim is
based on a constitutional right, a legislature can create statutory rights
that provide broader protections than the Constitution.321
B.

Changing Standing Doctrine

Restricting standing’s application to suits that do raise relevant
threats to the separation of powers may also affect the content of
standing doctrine. Currently, courts apply the same standing test in all

318. See Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 7–8
(2011) (discussing litigation costs of unpredictable jurisdictional rules). This is not to say
that eliminating standing from these cases would reduce total costs. Dispensing with
Article III standing could potentially result in more federal lawsuits. Although many of
those suits would likely be dismissed at preliminary stages for failing to state a claim, at
least some could go forward. It is a difficult empirical question whether the extra costs of
the new suits would exceed the savings from not having to litigate standing in other suits.
319. Pierce, supra note 309, at 1758.
320. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—and
Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 684 (2006) (suggesting that
expanding standing may result in constriction of rights to avoid awarding intrusive
remedies).
321. See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859–60 (2015) (“Congress enacted [the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993] in order to provide greater protection for
religious exercise than is available under the First Amendment.” (citing Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760–61 (2014))).
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cases.322 But as the aphorism “hard cases[] make bad law” suggests,
the particular considerations that drive the outcome of a case play a
large role in shaping the doctrine produced by that case.323 Evidence
suggests that the degree to which finding for the plaintiff would
interfere with the other branches of the government informs the
decision.324 For instance, Professor Fallon has argued that courts grow
more likely to deny standing in suits against the government as the
intrusiveness of the remedy against the government increases.325 Thus,
standing cases that present a real, relevant threat to separation of
powers are more likely to produce stringent standing doctrines, while
cases that do not threaten the separation of powers are likely to
generate less demanding doctrines.326
Compare, for example, Northeastern Florida Chapter of the
Associated General Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville327
with Summers v. Earth Island Institute, Inc.328 In Associated General
Contractors, non-minority contractors claimed that a government
program that gave preference to minority businesses violated their
equal protection rights.329 Although the plaintiffs could not prove that
they would have received the contracts if race were not a factor, the
Court held “the denial of equal treatment resulting from” the
322. See Fallon, supra note 49, at 1067 (noting that the test for Article III standing does
“not vary with the merits of a plaintiff’s claim”).
323. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904) (Homes, J., dissenting); see
also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 1
(1870) (“It is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and determines the
principle afterwards.”); Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
883, 883 (2006).
324. Hessick, supra note 13, at 76 (arguing that, although the same standing test applies
in all cases, courts may actually base their standing decisions on other considerations).
325. See Fallon, supra note 320, at 648–50 (developing a thesis that jurisdiction
doctrines reflect concerns about remedies).
326. See Fallon, supra note 49, at 1078 (arguing that standing is applied more strictly in
cases threatening core executive functions); see also Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 378 (1973) (arguing that judges necessarily exercise choice in every
decision, even when it appears they are simply following the law). Indeed, the desire to
achieve outcomes has led the Court to impose heightened standing requirements even in
some suits asserting private rights. For example, in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,
133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013), the Court denied standing in a Fourth Amendment challenge to a
government surveillance program, suggesting that standing is less likely to exist in suits
challenging “intelligence gathering.” Id. at 1147. But as the Court has described it,
standing doctrine is targeted at ensuring that courts decide only on rights, not at
preventing courts from hearing particular issues. Under the Court’s own rationale, the
threat to intelligence gathering provides a reason to avoid deciding the case, not for
lacking the power to decide it.
327. 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
328. 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
329. 508 U.S. at 666.
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preference, “not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit,” sufficed
for standing.330 By contrast, the Court held in Summers that a group
of environmentalists lacked standing to challenge Forest Service
regulations that excluded certain types of projects from various
procedural requirements.331 Like the program in Associated General
Contractors, the regulations in Summers posed a barrier to a benefit
desired by the plaintiffs. In the former, the plaintiffs desired the
ability to compete equally for contracts, while in the latter they
desired stronger environmental protections.332 Nevertheless, the
Court held the harm in Summers was too “generalized” to support
standing.333 The only apparent difference between the cases is that, in
Associated General Contractors, the plaintiffs sought to enforce their
equal protection rights, while the plaintiffs in Summers sought to
vindicate, not their individual rights, but the public interest in
securing government protection of the environment.334
Because the same standing test applies in all cases, these two
types of cases pull standing doctrine in opposite directions and
generate inconsistencies in standing.335 Dispensing with standing in
cases that do not threaten the separation of powers would eliminate
many of these inconsistencies. The cases that do not threaten the
separation of powers would no longer generate standing decisions
that seem incompatible with decisions in cases that do threaten the

330. Id.
331. 555 U.S. at 490, 497.
332. Id. at 490; Associated Gen. Contractors, 508 U.S. at 658.
333. 555 U.S. at 494–96 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–36 (1972)).
334. This is not to say that courts always impose higher barriers to standing in suits
raising separation-of-powers concerns. They do not. In Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, for
example, the Court stated that standing to challenge a federal action can be based solely
on the action’s interference with the plaintiff’s ability to observe animals in other
countries, “even for purely esthetic purposes.” 504 U.S. 555, 562–63 (1992) (citing Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)); see Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean
Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986) (finding “a sufficient ‘injury in fact’ in that the whale
watching and studying of their members [would] be adversely affected by continued whale
harvesting” (citing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970))). The point is that when courts do impose higher barriers to standing they tend to
involve cases implicating the powers of other branches.
335. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal
Prosecutions Show that Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places,
97 MICH. L. REV. 2239, 2246–48 (1999) (noting inconsistencies in the application of the
doctrine to private and public cases); Hessick, supra note 23, at 276 (noting the
incoherence and confusion); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational
Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 639 (1999) (stating that standing
doctrine rests on “extremely complex and unwieldy threshold issues of fact, ill-suited to
judicial resolution”).
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separation of powers. Standing law thus would become more
coherent and predictable.336
A second consequence is that eliminating standing from cases
that do not threaten the separation of powers would tend to make
standing more stringent in cases in which it still applies. That is
because non-threatening cases would no longer generate opinions
tending to dilute standing doctrine. The only cases addressing
standing would be those that present the sort of threat to the
separation of powers that standing is designed to handle, and the
decisions in those cases would tend, over time, to create a more
demanding law of standing than currently exists. Standing accordingly
would apply to a narrower set of cases. But the constraints imposed
by standing would be stronger.
For example, in challenges to administrative regulations (which
do not rest on private rights),337 courts might eventually curtail
standing based on emotional or aesthetic injury, based on the
conclusion that those injuries are inherently subjective and allow for
broad standing to challenge government action.338 Likewise, they may
limit standing based on injuries that plaintiffs create through their
own deliberate actions, because of the ease of creating standing to
challenge those actions.339
A more stringent standing law in these areas would have at least
two consequences. First, it would better insulate government
decisions. That would lead to fewer government resources being
required to fend off court challenges. It could also result in agencies
being more willing to adopt new regulations because they are less
likely to face successful court challenges. Further, it could lead to
increased scrutiny of government actions by other institutions, such as
Congress and the public, because a more stringent standing doctrine
336. Of course, it would not prevent all inconsistencies. Different theories of
separation of powers held by different Justices create inconsistencies in standing doctrine
in cases that do raise separation-of-powers concerns. For example, FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S.
11, 13 (1998), written by Justice Breyer, who holds a broad view of standing, granted
standing to individuals seeking information under the Federal Election Campaign Act, but
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 170 (1974), written by Chief Justice Burger, who
held a narrower view, denied standing to individuals seeking information under the
Constitution.
337. See supra text accompanying notes 181–85.
338. See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1986)
(denying standing based solely on harm caused by seeing public display of cross); Robert
J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to “Accidental” Plaintiffs: Lessons from
Environmental and Animal Law Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 85 (2010) (“[A]esthetic” injury
[is] an inherently subjective concept.”).
339. See Pushaw, supra note 338, at 94.
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would reduce the availability of judicial oversight, which currently
plays a large role in constraining government action.
Second, a more demanding standing doctrine may also increase
the political capital of the courts. Courts depend on other
governmental institutions to enforce their orders; if the judiciary
enters too many disfavored decisions, those other institutions may
refuse to enforce the orders.340 Affording greater protection for
government decisions through more rigorous standing requirements
reduces the opportunity for courts to render decisions unpopular with
the other branches. Accordingly, if a court were to enter a disfavored
order in a suit in which it did find standing under the more rigorous
test, the other branches of government may be more willing to
submit.
CONCLUSION
If separation of powers is the “single basic idea” motivating
Article III standing,341 Article III standing is overbroad. Many suits
do not raise the kinds of threats to separation of powers that Article
III standing doctrine purports to combat. If we accept the Court’s
justifications for standing, standing should not apply in those cases.
Federal courts should skip the standing inquiry and proceed to apply
the other substantive and procedural rules for deciding cases.
Dispensing with standing in cases in which its rationale does not
apply will have various benefits. It will save the resources and effort
spent on resolving standing—which is often difficult to resolve—in
cases in which it should not apply. It will also remove the unnecessary
opportunity for erroneous rulings in those cases.
Restricting the application of standing to cases in which its
separation-of-powers reasons apply will also improve the quality of
standing doctrine. Despite the insistence that a single standing test
applies to all cases, standing doctrine has badly fragmented into
different strands. That fragmentation is due in large part to different
values and concerns influencing standing decisions.342 Removing the
standing inquiry from cases in which standing should not apply would
340. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
55–59 (1980).
341. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
752 (1984)).
342. Hessick, supra note 13, at 76 (“Although framing their decisions in terms of
whether a threat is speculative or not, courts may actually base their standing decisions on
matters such as separation of powers, federalism, efficiency, docket size, or some other
concern.”).
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decrease that fragmentation, thereby increasing coherence and
consistency. Moreover, confining the standing inquiry to cases that
actually raise salient separation-of-powers issues will have the
tendency over time to change the doctrine so that it more accurately
implements the purpose behind standing. Cases that do not present
separation-of-powers concerns will no longer have a diluting
influence on the doctrine.343
This is not to say, however, that standing should extend to the
cases that raise these threats to the separation of powers. Some
commentators have strongly argued that standing should impose no
impediment to lawsuits, even to private actions asserting public
rights,344 or that courts should dispense altogether with standing as a
separate jurisdictional limitation.345 But irrespective of whether
standing should apply to those types of actions, it should not apply to
cases that do not threaten the separation of powers.
Of course, although the Court has said that separation of powers
is the only consideration underlying standing, its decisions do not
always match its rhetoric. Standing decisions often seem to reflect
other concerns, such as protecting federalism, preserving the
autonomy of plaintiffs, and controlling the docket size. Likewise, it is
entirely possible that standing doctrine actually rests on a different
conception of separation of powers than the one the Court has
articulated in justifying standing. To the extent that courts think
standing should be used for these reasons, the doctrine should be
expressly reformulated to embrace those concerns. But if the Court
firmly believes that standing exists solely to protect the separation of
powers, as articulated by the Court, that doctrine is vastly overbroad.

343. See Hessick, supra note 23, at 322 (noting the effects of the facts of the case on the
development of standing).
344. See Monaghan, supra note 107, at 1370–71.
345. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 221–24.

